Rejoin. Stay Out. Stay Still.* | Why Britain’s New Argument About Europe May Lead to the Same Place

A Familiar Argument Returns

As discussion about Britain’s future relationship with Europe becomes more explicit, two opposing camps are beginning to re-emerge. One argues that Britain’s difficulties stem substantially from Brexit, and that closer alignment, or eventual re-entry into the European Union, offers the most credible route towards economic stability and political coherence. The other argues that Britain’s difficulties stem from a failure to fully exploit Brexit, and that greater sovereignty, greater divergence, and a more confident assertion of national independence offer the better path.

At first glance, these appear to be fundamentally different futures. They are not. That is not because the outcomes would be identical; they would not. Rejoining and staying out would almost certainly be experienced differently, would produce different trade-offs, and would generate different winners and losers. The deeper question is whether either option addresses the forces that have been steadily weakening Britain’s capacity to govern itself effectively over the past several decades.

My argument is not that Rejoin and Stay Out are the same. It is that both risk leading to a condition I call Stay Still*. And the asterisk matters, because there is no such thing as standing still.

What “Stay Still*” Actually Means

When most people hear the phrase “stay still”, they imagine stability. I mean something very different.

In politics, government, business, charities, and institutions of every kind, standing still is largely an illusion. Infrastructure ages whether it is renewed or not. Institutions weaken whether they are reformed or not. Capabilities erode whether they are maintained or not, and problems accumulate whether they are addressed or not.

A nation that stops renewing itself is not preserving its condition; it is gradually consuming the strengths it inherited from earlier generations.

This is why the phrase requires an asterisk. Stay Still does not mean nothing changes. It means the underlying trajectory continues. The language changes, the politics changes, and the slogans change, yet the deeper direction remains largely untouched.

If that trajectory is already producing declining resilience, weakening institutions, growing dependency, and diminishing public confidence, then “staying still” is simply another name for managed deterioration.

A more accurate phrase might be stability without renewal.

The Problems Britain Cannot Escape

The strongest objection to this argument is obvious: surely Britain’s relationship with Europe matters?

Of course it does. Trade, regulation, investment, and international relationships all matter. The question is whether these are the primary causes of Britain’s current difficulties.

Consider a handful of problems that have persisted through multiple governments, multiple economic strategies, and both sides of the Brexit divide. Productivity growth has remained weak since the financial crisis. Housing affordability remains a chronic problem, and regional inequalities remain among the largest in the developed world. Public infrastructure is under growing strain, public trust in institutions has weakened, and public services face mounting pressure despite repeated reform efforts.

These are not uniquely British problems, nor were they created in 2016. In many cases they predate Brexit by decades. Brexit did not create them; it exposed them.

Britain has already lived through multiple waves of reform designed to address various aspects of these challenges. New Labour modernised public services through targets, outsourcing, and public-private partnerships. The Coalition pursued austerity and state restructuring. Successive governments promised regional rebalancing, devolution, industrial strategies, productivity plans, levelling up, Brexit renewal, and institutional reform.

Yet many of the underlying measures that shape everyday life – productivity, housing affordability, regional inequality, infrastructure resilience, and public trust – remain stubbornly persistent. The language changed. The programmes changed. The diagnosis often changed. But the deeper condition proved remarkably resistant to treatment. And ten years after the referendum, there is still little evidence that either side of the European argument has developed a convincing answer to these problems.

The Politics of Exhaustion

This is where the concept of exhaustion becomes important. By exhaustion, I do not mean frustration or fatigue. I mean the point at which a political system continues to generate activity while losing the ability to generate genuinely new answers.

Policies, manifestos, announcements, and arguments all continue, yet the range of acceptable solutions becomes increasingly narrow. The same assumptions reappear, the same frameworks dominate, the same debates return, and the same institutions produce variations of familiar answers.

Viewed through that lens, the return of the European argument is revealing. It tells us less about Europe itself than about the narrowing imaginative range of Britain’s political class.

When systems struggle to solve deep structural problems, they often return to familiar territory: old arguments feel safer than new thinking, and known routes appear more credible than unexplored ones. The result is a political environment that increasingly debates direction while struggling to imagine destination.

This points towards a deeper divide than the one currently dominating headlines. By the “operating system”, I mean the set of assumptions, institutions, and habits of management through which Britain is currently governed, which I examine more fully in the next section.

The deepest divide in British politics is no longer between Rejoin and Stay Out. It is between those who believe the existing operating system can still be managed successfully and those who believe it has reached its limits.

Seen this way, the European argument increasingly resembles a disagreement about how to navigate the current system rather than whether a different system is required.

The Establishment as a Worldview

To understand why this matters, it is necessary to define what I mean by “the Establishment.” I do not primarily mean politicians, civil servants, journalists, business leaders, or any particular group of people. I mean a worldview: a shared set of assumptions about what is realistic, responsible, and possible. That worldview is built around market primacy, financial credibility, perpetual economic growth, technocratic management, institutional self-preservation, and centralised expertise.

Most people operating within this worldview do not experience it as an ideology. They experience it as common sense, which is why it is so powerful, and why political disagreement can so often occur entirely within its boundaries.

Rejoin and Stay Out appear fundamentally opposed, yet both frequently continue to accept many of the same assumptions about economics, governance, institutions, and progress.

They disagree about Britain’s relationship with Europe, but they often agree far more than either admits about the operating system underneath.

The danger here is not simply that Rejoin or Stay Out fails; political systems survive failure all the time. It is that either could succeed politically while failing structurally, leaving Britain believing that a fundamental problem has been solved when only one aspect of it has been addressed. Apparent solutions can make deeper problems harder to see rather than easier to solve, and that is the pattern I turn to next.

The Phoenix Paradox

This brings us to what I have previously called The Phoenix Paradox, which describes a situation in which the appearance of renewal becomes an obstacle to genuine renewal.

In simple terms: a visible solution can make a problem harder to solve if it creates the illusion that meaningful change has already occurred.

The pattern is familiar. A reform is introduced, the public sees action, and expectations rise. But the underlying causes remain largely intact, so disappointment follows and confidence in future reform falls. The original problem survives and, in some cases, becomes even harder to address than before.

This danger matters because both Rejoin and Stay Out risk functioning as Phoenix cures. A Rejoin project could persuade people that Brexit was the fundamental issue, only for deeper structural problems to remain. A Stay Out project could persuade people that incomplete Brexit was the fundamental issue, only for those same problems to remain.

Neither outcome would necessarily prove the original diagnosis wrong. It would simply demonstrate that constitutional change and structural renewal are not the same thing.

But Surely the Outcomes Would Be Different?

Yes, and this is worth acknowledging clearly.

Rejoin and Stay Out are not equivalent. Rejoining may reduce some forms of friction, improve institutional coherence, and create different economic opportunities, while remaining outside may preserve greater political discretion and allow for different policy choices. The distinction matters, the outcomes matter, and the experiences would differ.

The argument here is not that Rejoin and Stay Out are identical. The argument is that both remain largely situated within the same underlying worldview, and may therefore struggle to produce fundamentally different long-term trajectories.

Both continue to be heavily market-facing and to judge success through broadly similar assumptions. Both prioritise management over reconstruction, and both operate within a paradigm that struggles to imagine alternatives to itself.

As a result, the disagreement is over the shape and speed of the journey rather than its ultimate direction.

What Genuine Renewal Might Require

At this point an obvious question emerges: if neither Rejoin nor Stay Out represents genuine renewal, what would?

The purpose of this article is not to provide a full blueprint, but it is possible to identify the broad direction. Genuine renewal would require a shift from managing outcomes to rebuilding capability, with renewed attention to productive capacity, local economies, institutional resilience, democratic accountability, energy security, infrastructure, community governance, and long-term stewardship.

Most importantly, it would require questioning assumptions that have become so normal that they no longer appear ideological.

The greatest obstacle to genuine renewal is not opposition but paradigm blindness, because a society cannot build alternatives while treating its current assumptions as immutable reality.

Conclusion

Britain increasingly presents itself as facing a new choice: Rejoin, or Stay Out. Yet beneath the surface lies a more fundamental question. Can Britain renew the capabilities that allow nations to thrive? Can it rebuild resilience, agency, institutional capacity, and public confidence? Can it imagine solutions that extend beyond the assumptions that have governed the last forty years? Those questions receive remarkably little attention compared with arguments about Britain’s constitutional relationship with Europe, and that omission is significant.

The greatest danger facing Britain is not that it chooses Rejoin, nor that it chooses Stay Out. It is that either choice is mistaken for renewal itself. Each would bring a different journey, with different frictions, opportunities, and political stories, and would alter the pace, shape, and character of Britain’s future. But if both remain rooted in the same assumptions that produced the current condition, they may differ more in experience than in destination. The question this article raises is whether either produces a different underlying trajectory.

That is what Stay Still* means: not the absence of movement, but the absence of transformation. Rejoin. Stay Out. Stay Still.* Because there is no such thing as standing still.

Further Reading

This article draws on a series of pieces I have written since May 2026. If you would like to explore any of the ideas in more depth, they are grouped below by theme and listed in the order I would suggest reading them.

The European Argument

Brexit and the Halfway House: Why Britain Cannot Move Forward or Back (12 May 2026)

Argues that Brexit was not the cause of Britain’s difficulties but the first visible rupture in an old order already reaching its limits, leaving the country suspended in a halfway house between the European Union and genuine independence.

Ten Years On: Brexit, Globalisation and the Halfway House Britain Still Can’t Escape (23 June 2026)

A decade-on reflection that places Brexit within the wider forces of globalisation, and asks why Britain remains stuck in the halfway house it entered when it left.

The Politics of Exhaustion: Why Europe Is Becoming Westminster’s Last Remaining Option (4 November 2026)

Suggests that the growing attraction of rejoining reveals less about the strength of the European option than about the weakness of every other option open to Westminster, as a political system running out of ideas returns to familiar territory.

The Ideas Behind the Argument

The Establishment Is Not What You Think It Is (15 July 2026)

Sets out the case that the modern Establishment is best understood as a worldview rather than a class or a group of people, and explains why that makes it so hard to recognise and escape.

The End of Britain’s Current Operating Model: Thatcherism’s Forty-Year Reign and the Beginning of the Post-Thatcher Era (1 August 2026)

Examines the operating model that has shaped Britain for roughly forty years and considers what it would mean for that era to be ending, the fullest treatment of the “operating system” referred to in this article.

The Phoenix Paradox (12 November 2026)

Explores how the appearance of renewal can become an obstacle to genuine renewal, when a visible solution creates the illusion that meaningful change has already occurred.

Each piece stands on its own, but read in this order they trace a single argument: from Britain’s halfway-house position after Brexit, through the exhaustion of its political options, to the worldview that shapes them and the question of what genuine renewal would require.

The Politics of Exhaustion | Why Europe is Becoming Westminster’s Last Remaining Option

There are moments in politics when a government appears to be making choices.

And there are moments when it becomes apparent that it is simply running out of them.

Increasingly, Britain feels like the latter.

The significance of the recent interventions by Andy Burnham and Rachel Reeves is not that they have reopened the European question. That process has been creeping forward for years through the language of resets, partnerships, alignment and cooperation.

What has changed is something subtler.

For the first time since Brexit, influential figures are beginning to talk as though Britain’s long-term future may ultimately lie back inside the European project itself. What was once implied is increasingly being stated. What was once political subtext is beginning to look like political direction.

Most commentary has focused on what this says about rejoining The EU.

The more interesting question is what it says about Westminster.

Because the growing attraction of Europe may reveal less about the strength of the European option than the weakness of every other option now visible to Britain’s governing class.

The Halfway House Reaches its Limit

Since leaving the European Union, Britain has existed in an uncomfortable halfway house.

The country formally left the institutional structures of the bloc, yet many of the deeper forces that shaped Britain’s economy remained largely untouched. Financialisation continued. Centralisation continued. Dependence on debt-fuelled growth continued. Productive capacity remained weak. Regional imbalances remained stubbornly entrenched.

The reconstruction that was supposed to follow Brexit never truly arrived.

As a result, Britain has spent much of the last decade trapped in an increasingly peculiar position. Outside enough of The EU to lose some of the advantages of membership, yet without having undertaken the structural reforms necessary to exploit the opportunities of departure.

It is a position that satisfies almost nobody.

And because it satisfies almost nobody, a conclusion has gradually become stronger within parts of the political establishment that ‘leaving’ was the mistake.

But that conclusion rests upon a significant assumption.

It assumes that Britain’s difficulties were created by Brexit rather than revealed by it.

Running Out of Road

The political reality confronting any government today is brutal.

Economic growth remains weak. Public services require resources that governments struggle to provide. Infrastructure demands investment measured in decades while politics increasingly operates in electoral cycles. Housing remains dysfunctional. Productivity remains stagnant. Debt constrains everything.

Every government enters office promising change.

Every government eventually discovers the same limitations.

The result is a political system that increasingly appears trapped.

There is no obvious tax solution.

There is no obvious spending solution.

There is no obvious growth solution.

There is certainly no quick solution.

Eventually a point is reached where governments stop searching for better answers and start searching for larger frameworks.

That is where Europe enters the picture.

Not necessarily as an ideal.

Not necessarily even as a conviction.

But as a mechanism.

A system that appears capable of creating options where none currently exist.

A framework large enough to absorb problems that national governments increasingly struggle to solve.

A route that appears, at least superficially, to lead somewhere.

The Last Remaining Answer

Viewed through this lens, the recent interventions from Burnham and Reeves take on a different significance.

They can be read not simply as endorsements of Europe but as acknowledgements of a deeper reality.

Westminster is running out of ideas.

This is not an accusation of incompetence. Almost any government would likely arrive at a similar position. The constraints are structural rather than personal.

Yet the consequences are profound.

When political systems exhaust their available options, they begin returning to familiar territory. Solutions previously rejected acquire new appeal. Paths once abandoned begin to look attractive again.

EU membership increasingly feels like such a path.

Not because it has suddenly become irresistible.

But because it is increasingly difficult for many within the political establishment to imagine anything else.

The attraction lies not necessarily in EU strength.

It lies in domestic weakness.

The Electoral Calculation

This is why the next general election may prove far more significant than many currently realise.

At present, no government possesses a clear mandate to pursue eventual re-entry into the European Union.

That obstacle remains substantial. But obstacles in politics have a habit of becoming opportunities.

A future manifesto offering a pathway towards deeper integration, closer institutional alignment or eventual membership would solve an immediate political problem.

It would place responsibility back in the hands of voters.

And from the perspective of the governing class, it creates a remarkably attractive outcome regardless of the result.

If such a programme is rejected, the government falls and someone else inherits Britain’s problems. The incoming administration then encounters exactly the same fiscal constraints, infrastructure challenges, demographic pressures and economic limitations as its predecessor.

The reality does not change simply because the occupants of Whitehall do.

If the programme succeeds, however, the government acquires something it presently lacks: democratic legitimacy for a strategic shift towards Europe.

Either way, the dilemma is resolved.

Either the burden is transferred.

Or the mandate is secured.

That is what makes the European question increasingly attractive politically.

The Problem with Desperation

There is, however, a danger in all of this.

Political exhaustion can easily disguise itself as strategic clarity.

When governments become sufficiently constrained, the remaining options inevitably begin to look more attractive than they actually are. Familiarity starts to resemble foresight. Necessity starts to resemble wisdom.

Yet there is remarkably little evidence that the forces constraining Britain are uniquely British.

Many of the pressures visible in the United Kingdom are visible throughout the wider developed world. Weak growth. Demographic strain. Debt burdens. Housing shortages. Growing distrust of institutions. Political fragmentation.

The assumption now quietly emerging within Westminster is that these problems become more manageable inside the European framework.

Perhaps they do. But that remains an assumption rather than a demonstrated fact.

After all, the European Union itself is increasingly confronting profound questions about its own future direction. Debates around fiscal sustainability, economic divergence, governance and political legitimacy are becoming more frequent, not less.

This raises an uncomfortable possibility.

What if Westminster is treating Europe as a solution to pressures that Europe itself is struggling to resolve?

Paradigm Blindness

Perhaps the most important aspect of this debate is not Europe at all. It is the lens through which Britain’s political class sees the world.

Every generation becomes captive to certain assumptions. Over time those assumptions become so deeply embedded that they cease to appear ideological. They simply become reality.

The assumption that larger systems are inherently more stable.

The assumption that deeper integration necessarily produces better outcomes.

The assumption that political problems can ultimately be solved through better administration and larger frameworks.

These assumptions shaped much of the modern political era. They also shaped the generation of politicians currently running it.

This is why the growing movement towards Europe may represent something deeper than policy.

It may represent the limits of political imagination.

Faced with mounting pressures and shrinking room for manoeuvre, Westminster continues searching for solutions inside the framework that produced its understanding of the world.

Europe remains visible because Europe belongs to that framework.

Everything else appears increasingly unimaginable.

Conclusion

The emerging debate about Europe is often presented as a debate about Britain’s future relationship with the European Union.

In reality, it may be a debate about something else entirely.

It may be a debate about what happens when a political class reaches the edge of its available options.

Britain’s governing institutions increasingly appear to believe that Europe represents the last remaining route back towards growth, stability and governability. That belief may yet shape the next general election. It may even become the defining strategic proposition offered to the electorate.

Whether it succeeds is another matter entirely.

Because the central question is not whether rejoining the EU can be presented as an answer.

The central question is whether Britain’s problems are actually the kinds of problems EU membership can solve.

That distinction may determine far more than the next election.

It may determine whether Westminster is identifying a genuine path forward, or simply pursuing the last answer it still knows how to imagine.

The Water Fish Cannot See

Why the debate about ending forty years of neoliberalism may be missing the point

A Curious Reaction

When Andy Burnham first began talking about ending forty years of neoliberalism, I expected disagreement. Political ideas that touch something substantial almost always provoke a reaction.

What surprised me was not the fact that people argued about it, but the way they argued about it. Within a remarkably short period of time, the conversation seemed to settle into familiar territory.

Supporters presented the idea as a long-overdue recognition of Britain’s failures. Critics responded as though they were hearing an argument for returning to the 1970s. The disagreement was immediate, energetic and entirely predictable.

What interested me was something else.

The entire discussion appeared to assume that everybody already knew what the phrase meant. More than that, it assumed that everybody knew where the boundaries of the debate lay.

The disagreement was not over whether the phrase described reality, but over whether leaving that reality would be desirable.

The argument became a choice between continuation and reversal. We were either remaining on the path set in motion during the Thatcher years or attempting to retrace our steps back to an earlier model.

The possibility that neither description accurately captured the moment we are living through barely appeared.

That omission is worth dwelling on because it points toward a question that feels increasingly important.

How would anybody recognise the end of an era while they were still living inside it?

The Strange Journey of Political Language

Political systems are constantly searching for language that captures things people can already feel but struggle to describe. Most books never reach beyond their audience. Most detailed arguments remain where they begin. What tends to travel are phrases.

A phrase can migrate from essays into newspaper columns, from newspaper columns into think-tank reports, from think-tank reports into speeches and from speeches into everyday conversation.

The more successful the phrase, the further it travels.

What is interesting is that understanding rarely travels at the same speed.

By the time a useful phrase reaches the centre of political discourse, it has often become detached from the intellectual framework that produced it. Different people begin using it for different purposes. It stops functioning as an explanation and starts functioning as a signal. It becomes useful because it conveys a mood, a direction of travel or a sense that something important is happening.

That does not mean everybody using the phrase understands the same thing.

In fact, it often means the opposite.

The phrase survives precisely because different groups can pour different meanings into it.

This may be one reason the language of “forty years of neoliberalism” has been so successful. The phrase clearly touches a nerve. It captures a widespread feeling that something about Britain’s trajectory deserves re-examination. What remains far less clear is whether there is equal agreement about what is actually being described.

When Systems Disappear

Part of the difficulty lies in the way successful systems evolve.

Most people think of neoliberalism as a collection of policies. Privatisation. Deregulation. Globalisation. Financialisation. Depending on who is speaking, those developments either saved Britain or hollowed it out. Entire political careers have been built around defending or attacking those changes.

Yet policies are only the visible layer of a system.

The deeper layer is the collection of assumptions that develops around them.

What counts as economic success. What counts as competence. Which institutions matter. Which risks deserve attention. What questions can be asked. Which outcomes are considered realistic.

At first those assumptions are visible because people remember alternatives. Over time they become harder to see. New generations inherit them. Institutions are organised around them. Political careers are built within them. Eventually they stop appearing as assumptions and start appearing as reality.

The system disappears from view precisely because it becomes normal.

That is why I have always preferred thinking in terms of operating systems rather than ideologies.

People know they are choosing between ideologies.

They rarely realise they are working inside an operating system.

The Water Fish Cannot See

The old phrase about fish being unable to see water survives because it captures something profoundly human.

We are very good at adapting to our environment. In fact, we are so good at it that we often stop noticing the environment altogether.

The process is visible everywhere.

People adapt to fragility.

Institutions adapt to constraints.

Political parties adapt to assumptions.

Entire societies adapt to conditions that previous generations might have regarded as extraordinary.

Eventually the adaptation becomes so complete that the thing shaping behaviour vanishes into the background.

The fish sees the currents, the movement and the consequences. The fish does not see the water.

This is why discussions about political change often feel strangely unsatisfying. Politicians can spend hours arguing about policy while sharing assumptions they no longer recognise as assumptions. Journalists can write thousands of words about reform while accepting the framework within which reform is constrained. Economists can debate outcomes while rarely examining the environment producing them.

This is not evidence of stupidity.

It is evidence of immersion.

Why the Debate Feels Incomplete

The more I listened to the discussion surrounding the end of forty years of neoliberalism, the more I found myself wondering whether the debate was unfolding at the wrong level.

The assumption seemed to be that people stand outside the system, evaluate it and then choose whether to continue it.

But what if that is not how systems work?

What if people are shaped by an operating environment long before they start questioning it?

Viewed through that lens, the interesting question is not whether a political movement wishes to move beyond neoliberalism.

The interesting question is whether anybody can clearly see the assumptions they inherited from it.

That challenge becomes particularly difficult when those assumptions have become embedded within ideas that appear self-evident. Growth. Productivity. Competitiveness. Confidence. Credibility.

These concepts are treated as neutral descriptions of reality. Rarely are they examined as products of a particular way of understanding reality.

The water has become invisible.

Sensing an Ending

This is one reason I find the current moment so fascinating.

For several years I have argued that Britain’s operating model appears to be reaching the end of its natural life. Not because somebody decided it should end, but because the conditions that sustained it are changing. The issue is not morality. It is fit.

Operating systems work because they fit the environment in which they emerge. They begin to struggle when the environment changes faster than the assumptions embedded within them.

What strikes me today is how many institutions appear to be sensing this shift.

The language has changed.

The confidence has changed.

The mood has changed.

People speak increasingly about resilience, security, sovereignty, capability and exposure. Themes that sat comfortably in the background for decades have moved closer to the centre of public debate.

Something is clearly being felt.

Whether it is fully understood is another question.

History suggests that people often experience the sensation of transition before they understand its cause. They feel the edge of an era long before they can describe it.

The Language of Maintenance

This is partly why the recent Budget interested me.

What stood out was not a particular policy but a tone.

Much of the language revolved around creating “breathing space”, managing pressures and helping households navigate difficult circumstances. Even the temporary tax surcharge on banks was presented in terms of short-term support rather than long-term transformation.

The emphasis repeatedly returned to stability, discipline, confidence and the need to navigate a difficult external environment.

None of this is inherently unreasonable. Yet it has a particular flavour.

It is the language of maintenance. The language of holding things together. The language of preserving stability while a system encounters pressures for which it was not originally designed.

That does not mean the people using that language are wrong. It simply raises an interesting possibility.

Perhaps many of the actors discussing the end of an era are simultaneously operating within the assumptions of that era.

Not because they are trapped. But because they have never known anything else.

Missing the Point

This brings us back to the original phrase.

The debate about ending forty years of neoliberalism often assumes that the central question is whether neoliberalism succeeded or failed.

I am increasingly persuaded that a deeper question sits underneath it.

What if the most significant issue is not whether an era is ending, but whether we are capable of recognising the operating system that shaped the era in the first place?

The difference matters.

One debate concerns policies. The other concerns perception.

One asks what should happen next. The other asks whether we fully understand where we are standing now.

Those are not the same thing.

The Ground Beneath Our Feet

The most successful operating systems are not the ones people passionately defend. They are the ones people stop noticing.

The assumptions become common sense. The framework becomes reality. The environment becomes invisible.

At that point, even criticism of the system may continue speaking its language.

That is why I find the current moment so intriguing.

Not because I know what comes next.

Not because I am convinced anybody else does either.

But because more and more people seem to be sensing that something is changing beneath their feet.

The phrase “forty years of neoliberalism” may be evidence of that feeling. The argument surrounding it may be evidence too.

The question is not whether the era is ending.

It is whether we can see the water clearly enough to understand the thing that shaped us before it disappears.

When Tomorrow Showed Up

A story about money, integrity, and the bill we keep passing on to people who haven’t arrived yet

‘The process by which banks create money is so simple that the mind is repelled.’
– J. K. Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went (1975)

One: The Problem for Tomorrow

Everyone has at least been tempted to delay, put off or put on hold a problem when it feels like there is actually a choice. We know, deep down, that we aren’t helping ourselves when we do this, especially if there is an unknown or unpredictable outcome involved – which is probably why it feels so appealing, if not easy, to literally put it off for another day.

Think of the letter that sits unopened in the drawer. The damp patch on the ceiling that we tell ourselves we’ll get looked at in the spring. The conversation we rehearse in our heads a hundred times but never quite start. None of these problems go away because we stop looking at them. If anything, they quietly grow.

So, let’s imagine all the things we would like to put off. To not deal with. Those things that will have a price once dealt with or acted upon, which it would just be nice to leave behind and pretend that they, or the need to address them, simply don’t exist. A difficult message to a loved one? A truth about a new partner to a friend? A relationship or friendship that it would feel better not to have to tell someone in particular, or anyone else, about? The list could be endless if we think about it, and what all these things have in common is that they are about things like honesty, integrity, respect, care and consideration for others – or, collectively, what we might call doing the right thing.

My guess is that most people reading this will have experienced a situation like this at least once in their lifetime, if not on a number of occasions. I know I have.

Something these things always seem to share is that the longer they are left alone or remain hidden, the greater and more far-reaching the consequences of waiting become – particularly if the truth comes out without it being our choice to tell it.

Because a problem left for tomorrow doesn’t sit still. A small untruth needs a second one to protect it. A debt left unpaid gathers interest. A crack left unfilled lets in the water that widens it.

The cost of putting something off is almost never the same as the cost of dealing with it. It is almost always bigger – and it is very often paid by someone other than the person who chose to wait.

The funny thing is that when we don’t make that choice – when we know we could keep quiet, hide things or put the consequences off, but we do the right thing at the time anyway – these things have a habit of working out for the best. There is a moral pay-off, even when there isn’t a material one.

Now imagine something much bigger. Imagine finding a way of doing things that brings a massive reward, with the potential to provide many more – and, this is the important part, a way that means, if you are clever and stick to some boundaries and rules, any reckoning can be put off not just for another day, but for so many days that it might never be a day that you, your children or even their children will have to face. The ultimate problem for tomorrow. All you would have to do is make sure everyone keeps playing by the rules – even if they don’t know the game that’s actually being played.

Do that, and you might never have to face it at all. Nor would anyone you appointed, or anyone appointed by those who followed – because most of them wouldn’t even know…

Two: When Nobody Is Watching

What I am really talking about here is doing the right thing, even when nobody is watching. There is a word for that: integrity. Funnily enough, integrity isn’t the main subject of this story. But it sits underneath every part of it, and if there is one thing I would ask you to take away, it may well be this.

Integrity is easy when people are watching. The real test comes when we know we could get away with something – when the consequences won’t land on us, or won’t land for years, or will land on somebody we’ll never meet.

So here is a question to carry with you. If it would be wrong for one person to quietly push the cost of their choices onto someone else, does it become any less wrong when it is done by a bank? Or a government? Or a whole society?

Does something stop being wrong just because it is done on a bigger scale, by more people, over a longer time?

Let me tell you a story that might help us answer it.

Three: The Banker

Imagine, if you will, a man who works in a bank. Not one of the friendly faces behind the counter at your local high street branch, always sounding lovely as they reset passwords and talk new customers through everything they’ll need. He works at a bank with a name you often hear newsreaders mention in the same breath as markets, economics, how public borrowing is going, and jargon like GDP.

He isn’t just someone crunching the figures or talking to the media about monetary policy. He is one of the people with whom the buck really stops – deciding what is done with the bank’s money, who it lends to, what bonuses are paid, how much help is given to others, and of course who those others will actually be.

I’ll simply call him the Banker.

The Banker has everything he wants. But he would like to have more, and to be able to do bigger things – things that have a much bigger pay-off than before.

All his time in banking has taught him how money makes people think and how it makes them behave. He knows all the formulas that sit behind the psychological levers of money – whether someone is rich or poor, a business or a government, and whatever it is they need money for.

Before we go on, pause for a moment. If you were him, and you knew what he knew – what would you do with it?

Four: The Secret

Because he knows everything about money, and how every part of the system that surrounds it works, the Banker has worked out what people will believe about money – or are willing to believe.

And that means he could literally create more of it. So long as the people who weren’t in on the secret still believed that the money in their hands was exactly the same the day after he changed the system as it was the day before.

Most people, then and now, picture money as a thing. Something solid, kept in a vault, once backed by gold sitting in a basement somewhere.

For a long time that picture was at least partly true: a pound or a dollar was a promise that could, in theory, be swapped for something real.

But the Banker knew the picture didn’t need to be true. It only needed to be believed.

The magic of creating money from nothing rests on creating a debt that isn’t really owed to anyone – but which he knows will be repaid, because he is confident that anyone he lets into the secret, or lends this new money to, will always pay it back, in a way and on a timeline where nobody need ever know that this new way of doing things exists.

And it is astonishingly simple. When the Banker approves a loan, he doesn’t go to a safe and count out notes that someone else deposited. He simply types a new number into the borrower’s account.

That money did not exist a moment before. There is no lorry delivering it, no vault opening, no gold changing hands. There is only a promise to pay it back – and that promise becomes money. When the loan is repaid, the money quietly disappears again.

He calls this money creation ‘credit’ for short. And he imagines all the things that could be done with an almost endless supply of it, and all the people who could be helped – as long as it is legal, and as long as one golden rule is kept: never create money that could not have come from a ‘normal’ route, over what would be considered a ‘normal’ period of time.

Which raises a question worth sitting with. If money can be created simply by a promise to pay it back, what is money, really?

And then, what happens if the promises start to grow faster than the real things – the homes, the food, the skills, the work – that the money is supposed to stand for?

Five: Bringing Everyone on Board

Rules won’t be a problem, the Banker reasons. If the people who actually run the country are brought on board, they will benefit from the new system too, because it will make it a lot easier for them to do whatever they want to do – as long as they play by the same rules of money creation, and change whatever rules and laws need changing to make it all legal.

‘We can give money to whoever we decide,’ he tells himself, ‘and nobody will ask where it comes from, because we are the banks. Nobody will see what’s really going on, as long as we play it right.’

So the Banker, and a few other bankers who share his world view and understanding, decide to go ahead. They bring in the people they need, all of whom benefit in some way from being on board – politicians who can suddenly pay for the things that make their lives easier, other bankers who are paid well, and key business people who know their stuff and can be trusted to pay back on time.

‘With the power we have,’ they agree, ‘we will be able to make whatever adaptations we need to do what we want – as long as we keep it real.’

Of course, money has a different effect on different people – especially when power and influence are involved – so, as the scope and dark brilliance of the new system rolls out, frameworks are put in place to make it all look responsible.

‘We will police the system by creating credit agencies,’ the Banker decides, ‘and as time goes by we will be able to judge everyone’s credibility by the records we keep on them.’

It would be easy to make the Banker a villain. But I don’t think that would be fair – and it would let the rest of us off far too lightly. Schemes like his are rarely born out of pure greed. More often they are born out of a problem that seems too big to solve any other way. A war that has to be paid for. A country that has to be rebuilt. A crisis that won’t wait. It is no accident that the Bank of England itself was founded, back in 1694, to lend money to a government that needed to fight a war.

And at first, it works. Roads are built. Homes are bought. Businesses start that would never otherwise have got off the ground. Wars are fought and, in some cases, won.

If you’re honest, you might even be on the Banker’s side by now. What’s the problem? It sounds brilliant.

Which brings us to one of the oldest moral questions there is: can something be wrong if the outcome is right? If the secret bought a victory, a recovery, a generation of prosperity – does the way it was done still matter?

Hold on to your answer. We will need it later.

Six: The Golden Rule

Everything depends on the golden rule: never create more money than could have come about by a ‘normal’ route, over a ‘normal’ period of time.

In other words – never let the promises get too far ahead of the real world.

I think it is quite possible that the Banker kept to that rule. He may have been confident – perhaps over-confident – but he understood what he had made, and why the limits mattered.

For anyone with a strong sense of what is right and what is wrong, it’s difficult to fathom the idea that money can be created literally by saying ‘this money now exists’ – especially if you’ve never had a lot, and have perhaps struggled to make ends meet with what you had.

But for those who have grown used to money, and comfortable with it, the morality looks very different.

And a rule like the Banker’s has a weakness built into it. It relies entirely on the restraint of whoever comes next. And whoever comes after them. And whoever comes after them.

Can you build a system that relies, forever, on the self-control of people you will never meet?

Seven: Passing the Baton

It started out well. The key was to stick to the rules. But the Banker, who designed the system and understood its limits, saw it very differently from those who came after him and had never known anything else.

The secret – or rather the open secret this system always really was, hidden only because so many people still thought all the money flowing around was ‘real’ – was passed like a baton from one generation of beneficiaries to the next. And with each handover, the new hands lost a little more sight of what was needed to keep it all under control.

Think about how a habit forms in any family or organisation. The first generation makes an exception, for a good reason, in a time of need. The second gets used to the exception. The third mistakes the exception for the rule. And the fourth cannot imagine there was ever any other way.

By the time the baton reaches that fourth pair of hands, nobody is asking whether the system is right any more. They are only asking how to get more out of it. And most of them aren’t bad people. They are doing exactly what they were trained to do, in the only system they have ever known.

The Banker’s successors started to believe it would be possible – realistic, even – to pay for whatever they wanted, especially if it gave them greater control over the profits and incomes they could then use to pay the ‘debt’ from the ‘credit’ back.

Around the 1980s, they found a philosophy to match. Economists today often call it neoliberalism, but at its heart was a simple belief: that markets, left free to buy, sell, compete and borrow, would always make better decisions than governments or communities could.

So industries that had been built and owned in common were sold off. The rules on banks and borrowing were loosened. Money was set free to go wherever it could earn the highest return, as fast as it could get there.

Put that belief together with the Banker’s secret, and something powerful happens. Money stops flowing mainly towards the things a community needs, and starts flowing towards whatever makes more money fastest.

And the question nobody inside the system seemed to ask was the simplest one of all: what happens to the places, the jobs and the people that the money flows away from?

Eight: The Hollowing Out

Unfortunately, whether by design or by accident, having control over what so many people see as real wealth also made those at the centre of the system, and those they helped, blind to consequence – blind to what money that is only believed to be real actually does when everyone who believes in it behaves as if it really is.

Over time, everything was hollowed out. People’s lives, communities and the environment were all hollowed out, and the value they once held was replaced by that giant IOU called credit. It took away the real value and left behind an extraordinary form of human debt: the loss of being able to identify with, and relate to, who we all really are.

That hollowing out rarely makes the headlines in one go. It happens a little at a time.

A family firm that has made things in the same town for eighty years is bought with borrowed money – and the debt used to buy it is loaded onto the firm itself. The buildings are sold and rented back. The profitable parts are sold off, the pension fund is squeezed, and what is left is closed when it can no longer carry the weight.

In the City, it is called a successful deal. In the town, a trade that took generations to learn disappears in a couple of years.

Homes stop being places to live and become places to put money. Prices rise faster than wages, year after year, because it is easier to lend against a house than to build a business. The parents who bought a home on one wage watch their children struggle to rent on two.

Water, energy, railways and the other things that were once built and owned in common are sold, borrowed against and run to produce a return. When the pipes leak, the rivers suffer and the bills rise, the debt is still there – and someone still expects to be paid.

The high street empties. The skills leave. The young people leave. And slowly, a place forgets what it was for.

None of this shows up as a debt on anyone’s bank statement. But it is a debt all the same. And from very early on, it was the people at the bottom of the ladder – the workers, the small towns, the communities with the least say – who paid it first, and paid it in full.

The debt was never only financial. The real bill was paid in lives, in places, and in the world around us.

Nine: The Stories We Were Told

At some point, the people doing well out of the system must have noticed. Not all of them, and perhaps not all at once.

But you cannot close that many factories, sell off that many shared assets, or watch that many town centres empty without someone, somewhere, beginning to ask questions.

And this is where the story becomes less about money and more about people. Because when a system that everyone depends on starts to show its cracks, the easiest thing to do is not to fix it. It is to explain it.

So we were given stories. That the jobs went because of technology, or global competition, or because people simply didn’t want to work. That the money had run out because of whoever was easiest to blame that year. That if prices rose, it was always someone else’s fault. That the answer to too much debt was more debt. That growth – measured by a number called GDP – would sooner or later lift everyone.

Some of those stories had grains of truth in them. Many were told by people who honestly believed them. But they all had one thing in common: they kept attention away from the system itself.

When the whole thing nearly fell over in 2008, it wasn’t allowed to. The banks were rescued. Then the central banks – the Bank of England among them – reached for the Banker’s oldest trick on the grandest scale yet. They created hundreds of billions of pounds of new money and called it ‘quantitative easing’.

The new money was used to buy up government debt and other assets, holding interest rates down and propping up prices. It kept the system going. Many have argued that it also made those who already owned property, shares and other assets a great deal richer, while those who owned nothing watched the things they needed slip further out of reach.

By then, some economists had begun to say out loud what the Banker had always known. A school of thought called Modern Monetary Theory argued that a country which creates its own currency can never simply ‘run out’ of money the way a household can – and that the real limit on what it can do isn’t money at all, but real things: people, skills, materials, energy and land. Push beyond those, and prices rise.

Whatever you think of that idea, notice where it lands. Even the theory that says money itself isn’t the problem agrees that real things are the limit. And real things – the skills, the industries, the communities, the land and the environment – are exactly what had been hollowed out.

You can create money from nothing. You can’t create a lost trade, a living river or a community’s sense of itself the same way.

Underneath it all sat one belief, so comfortable that it rarely needed saying out loud: that this is a system where everyone can have whatever they want, and worry about paying the bill later.

Of course, nobody can. Not a person, not a bank, not a country. A system that only survives by bringing in ever more borrowing to pay for the promises it has already made starts to look uncomfortably like a giant Ponzi scheme – and the thing being borrowed against, in the end, is the future itself.

Ten: Where Has All the Money Gone?

Over time, governments became completely beholden to the system too. Their success was measured by GDP – a number that counts how much is bought and sold, not whether life is getting any better. And when they needed more money than they raised in taxes, they borrowed it by selling bonds – in Britain, they are called gilts. A gilt is simply an IOU: lend the government money today, and it promises to pay you interest every year and give your money back on a set date.

Those IOUs are held by banks, pension funds, insurers and investors at home and abroad – and, after all that quantitative easing, by the Bank of England itself. Every year, interest has to be paid on every one of them.

It was only when things had gone so far that a once-rich country like the UK could no longer afford to do the things it used to do that ordinary people began asking the same question: where has all the money gone? And if we are now paying more in interest on what the country owes than we spend each year on educating our children – where do all those interest payments actually go?

The answer is simple, and uncomfortable. A large part of it goes to those who already hold money – paid for by those who do the work, through their taxes, through public services that no longer stretch as far, and through all the things that quietly stop being done.

Which brings us back to where this story began. Who decided this was a problem for tomorrow? And who did they think would be standing there when tomorrow arrived?

Eleven: When Tomorrow Showed Up

You may have realised by now that this is where – exactly where – we are right now.

The Banker’s story was never really about one banker. It is the story of the money in your pocket, the mortgage on your home, the pension you are counting on, and the country you live in. It is the story of the system we were all born into – the only one most of us have ever known.

And tomorrow didn’t arrive with a bang. There was no single day when the bill landed on the doormat. It arrived the way the damp patch on the ceiling does – slowly, and then all at once.

It arrived as a generation that cannot afford a home. As the potholes, the closed libraries and the waiting lists. As towns that have forgotten what they were for. As rivers that are no longer safe to swim in. As wages that buy less every year. As a growing sense, shared by people who agree on almost nothing else, that something has gone badly wrong – and that nobody in charge will say what.

And here is the cruellest part. The bill isn’t calculated in pounds. It is calculated in lost skills, lost trust, lost places and lost time. It can’t simply be refinanced, rolled over or printed away. The problem was never really put off at all. It was only passed on – to whoever happened to be standing there when tomorrow came.

The future has no vote. That is exactly why it was so easy to spend.

Twelve: The Greatest Crime of All Time?

So was this a crime? Perhaps even the greatest one of all time?

It is tempting to say yes, and to go looking for the people to blame. But remember how this story started.

Maybe the Banker had a genuine problem to solve. Maybe he kept to his own rules. Maybe most of those who followed him were decent people doing what they had been taught, in a system they never designed and never saw from the outside.

None of that makes it right. A harm doesn’t become acceptable because nobody meant it, or because it was spread across millions of hands over a hundred years. If anything, that is what makes it so serious.

A crime with a villain can be punished. A crime that everyone took part in, and that almost everyone benefited from in some small way, is far harder to face – because facing it means facing ourselves.

Which leads to the most uncomfortable question in this whole story. If you have ever had a mortgage, a pension, a loan or a credit card – or simply lived in a country that borrowed to keep the lights on – where do you stand in the chain?

And remember the question I asked you to hold on to: can something be wrong if the outcome was right?

What is your answer now?

Thirteen: Doing the Right Thing

We started with the small things – the message we didn’t send, the truth we didn’t tell, the letter we left in the drawer. And we said that the longer they are left, the bigger the consequences become, especially if the truth comes out without us choosing to tell it.

The same is true here. Tomorrow is already knocking at the door. The only real choice left is whether we open it ourselves – honestly, together, and with our eyes open – or wait for it to be kicked in.

Doing the right thing, even when nobody is watching, starts with being willing to look. To ask where money really comes from, who it really serves, and who really pays. To value the things that can’t be printed – skills, communities, places, the natural world and each other – as the real wealth they always were. And to stop handing our problems to people who aren’t here yet to argue back.

That is what integrity looks like when it is scaled up from one person to a whole society.

It isn’t easy. It never was. But as I hope this story has shown, the alternative was never really easier either.

It was only later.

Tomorrow has shown up. The only question left is what we do today.

Afterword: A Note on This Story

The Banker is not a real person. He is a way of telling a story that is far too big, and spread across far too much time, to be told any other way. He stands for the many people – bankers, politicians, officials and business leaders – who built, inherited and ran the monetary system we live with today.

Some of the details are simplified. Some of the steps may have happened in a different order, and some may have happened by accident rather than by design. Many of them were taken – and are still being taken – by people who have never seen or understood the monetary, financial and economic system in any other way. None of that changes the question at the heart of the story.

This was never meant to be an economics lecture. You didn’t need to know what a bond is, what fiat money means, or what anyone means by MMT or neoliberalism to follow it – and if you didn’t before, I hope you have a clearer idea now. What I hope you take away is a single question, and that you keep asking it: is this a problem for today, or a problem for tomorrow – and who decided?

Questions to Carry With You

For your own reflection, or for discussion with others:

  1. Does something stop being wrong just because it is done on a bigger scale, by more people, over a longer time?
  2. Can something be wrong if the outcome is right? Has your answer changed since you first met the question?
  3. If you had been the Banker, what would you have done with the secret?
  4. Where in your own town or community can you see the hollowing out? Who paid the bill – and who was paid?
  5. Which of the stories we were told have you believed? Which do you still believe?
  6. What would doing the right thing look like now – for you, for your community, and for the country?

A Few Words in Plain English

  • Credit – money lent to someone on the promise that they will pay it back. In today’s system, most new money comes into existence this way.
  • Debt – the other side of credit: what is owed, usually with interest on top.
  • Fiat money – money that has value because a government declares it to be money and people accept it, rather than because it can be swapped for gold or anything else.
  • Interest – the price of borrowing money; what the borrower pays the lender on top of the amount borrowed.
  • Bonds and gilts – IOUs that governments and companies sell to borrow money. A gilt is a UK government bond.
  • GDP (Gross Domestic Product) – a measure of the total value of everything bought and sold in a country in a year. It counts activity, not wellbeing.
  • Credit rating agencies – organisations that judge how likely a person, company or country is to repay what it owes.
  • Quantitative easing (QE) – when a central bank creates new money to buy government bonds and other assets, usually to keep interest rates low and the financial system running.
  • Neoliberalism – a set of ideas, dominant since around the 1980s, that markets usually make better decisions than governments, leading to privatisation and looser rules on finance.
  • MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) – an economic theory that says a country issuing its own currency can’t run out of money, and that the real limits are inflation and real resources.
  • Asset stripping – buying a business, often with borrowed money, and selling off its valuable parts for a quick profit, frequently leaving the rest to fail.
  • Ponzi scheme – a scheme that pays existing investors with money from new ones, and so collapses when the new money runs out.

Notes and Sources

  • The Bank of England was founded in 1694 to lend money to the government of William III, largely to fund war against France.
  • The end of the gold link: in August 1971 the United States suspended the conversion of dollars into gold, ending the last formal tie between the world’s major currencies and gold.
  • How banks create money: the Bank of England explains this in ‘Money creation in the modern economy’, Quarterly Bulletin, 2014 Q1.
  • Quantitative easing: the Bank of England’s asset purchases reached a peak of £895 billion between 2009 and 2021.
  • Debt interest and education: how UK debt interest compares with education spending depends on the year and on how each is measured. Check the latest figures from the Office for Budget Responsibility and HM Treasury before publication.
  • Epigraph: J. K. Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went (1975).

Do we exist only to serve government, or does government exist to serve us?

We grow up believing government exists to make life possible. To build, to protect, to maintain, to enable. To stand between us and the things that would otherwise overwhelm us.

But somewhere along the way, that relationship inverted.

Government stopped facilitating life. Life began facilitating government.

Not because government suddenly changed its intentions, but because the tools it once used to shape the country were quietly dismantled by a financial and monetary system that came to control everything.

For decades, that system rewarded extraction over production, leverage over labour, and financial performance over real capability. It told us stories about modernity – stories about efficiency, globalisation, competitiveness – and it sold myths that made decline feel like progress.

The service economy was one of those myths. A story that said Britain didn’t need to make things anymore, that production was old‑fashioned, that skills were optional, that capability could be imported, that resilience was unnecessary.

And while the country embraced that story, the wheels of productivity were quietly removed.

Factories closed. Skills faded. Infrastructure aged. Supply chains stretched across oceans. Local capability thinned to the point of transparency.

None of this felt dramatic. It felt like modern life. It felt like the world moving forward.

But the financial system wasn’t building the future. It was hollowing out the present.

And when government finally looked up, it realised the tools it once relied on – the tools that made governing possible – were gone.

By then, the productive foundations that once made governing possible had eroded. Government could no longer easily rebuild what had been dismantled, repair what had been neglected, produce what had been offshored, or control many of the systems on which it depended.

But government could not easily admit this. It could not stand before the public and say: “We no longer have enough of the tools required to shape the country.”

So it clung to the only lever it had left.

Taxation.

Taxation is not a sign of strength. It is a sign of limitation.

When a government still has capability, taxation is one tool among many. When a government has lost capability, taxation becomes the only tool left.

And that is where Britain now finds itself.

Increasingly, government appears to rely on taxation to compensate for a diminishing ability to build, repair, produce, grow, and prepare for what is coming.

Taxation becomes the way government sustains itself when it can no longer sustain the country.

If economic growth remains weak while obligations continue to rise, governments eventually face a narrowing set of options: higher taxation, deeper borrowing, monetary intervention, or external assistance.

At the far end of that path lies the possibility of IMF involvement.

IMF involvement would not rebuild capability. It would not restore resilience. It would not protect the public.

It would impose austerity of a kind that might keep politicians in their posts and government departments running, but for real people already struggling, the worst would still be to come.

Because IMF austerity protects the institution, not the population.

And all of this – the hollowing out, the loss of capability, the reliance on taxation, the looming austerity – is happening before external shocks hit.

Before supply chains fracture further. Before infrastructure failures accelerate. Before geopolitical instability intensifies. Before the next global downturn. Before the next energy crisis. Before the next financial contraction. Before the next systemic break. Before something as simple – and as devastating – as the real consequences of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Many within government can see the pressures gathering ahead. Yet the institutions themselves may lack the capacity, political consensus, or time required to respond effectively. They know they cannot rebuild fast enough. They know they cannot deliver everything that has been promised. They know they cannot easily escape the system they inherited.

So it turns to the public – not to protect them, but to sustain itself.

And this is where the moral reckoning begins.

A government that can no longer facilitate life has no moral right to ask the population to bear ever-greater burdens simply so that the institution itself can endure.

The legitimacy of government has never rested on its ability to survive. It has rested on its ability to serve.

Once that distinction is lost, citizens inevitably begin asking a simple question:

Who exists to serve whom?

Which brings us back – inevitably, unavoidably – to the question we began with:

Do we exist only to serve government, or does government exist only to serve us?

Because if government is no longer here to serve us, then what is this all now for?