There is something inherently reassuring about large interventions. Faced with a troubling statistic, particularly one involving hundreds of thousands of young people, the instinct to act feels both practical and humane. Indeed, any suggestion that doing nothing might be preferable is likely to strike most people as absurd. If large numbers of young people are struggling to find their place within work, education or training, surely the responsible response is to offer more support, more opportunities and more resources.
This is precisely why the recent proposal to spend £6 billion on tackling youth disengagement feels so difficult to challenge. The scale of the funding communicates seriousness. The language surrounding the proposal communicates concern. The intention appears entirely positive. Everything about it encourages the observer to conclude that society has recognised a problem and is mobilising resources to address it.
The difficulty, however, is that large interventions often reveal as much about how a problem is being understood as they do about how that problem might be solved. Before a single pound is spent, before a single young person enters a programme and before a single outcome is measured, an assumption has already been made. That assumption is rarely discussed because it sits quietly beneath the entire proposal, presenting itself not as an interpretation but as a fact.
The assumption is that the problem begins with disengagement.
Where the Story Begins
Once disengagement becomes the starting point, the rest of the discussion follows naturally. If young people are detached from employment, detached from education or detached from training, then the obvious task becomes finding ways to reconnect them.
More support appears sensible. More intervention appears necessary. More pathways appear desirable.
Yet there is another way of looking at the situation.
A young person does not suddenly arrive at adulthood and become disengaged in isolation from everything that came before. Long before anyone appears within an official category, long before they become visible to policymakers or programme designers, they have already spent years absorbing impressions about the world around them. They have watched people enter work. They have watched people struggle despite working. They have listened to promises about education and achievement. They have observed what qualifications seem to deliver and, perhaps more importantly, what they fail to deliver.
None of this takes place inside a government framework. None of it appears neatly within a dataset. Yet these observations help shape a person’s understanding of what participation actually means.
What makes the current debate feel incomplete is that it begins at the point where disengagement becomes measurable. By then, a great deal has already happened. The visible outcome takes centre stage whilst the conditions from which it emerged quietly retreat into the background.
The Destination Itself
For much of the post-war period, a largely unspoken bargain sat beneath public life. The bargain was never perfect and it certainly did not work equally well for everybody, but enough people believed in it for it to provide a degree of social stability.
Education increased opportunities. Work offered a route towards independence. Qualifications expanded the range of possibilities available.
Effort was not guaranteed to succeed, but it generally felt connected to outcomes in ways that most people could recognise.
Whether that bargain was ever quite as reliable as memory now suggests is open to discussion. What feels more significant is the possibility that increasing numbers of people no longer believe in it.
The distinction matters because a society can continue operating according to assumptions long after confidence in those assumptions has begun to erode.
Institutions continue encouraging participation because participation has historically been associated with desirable outcomes. Politicians continue promoting employment because employment has historically been associated with independence. Educational systems continue promoting attainment because attainment has historically been associated with opportunity.
What if the issue is not that young people fail to understand the value of these things, but that they are increasingly uncertain about what these things now lead to?
That is a very different question from the one currently being asked.
Participation and Independence
Much of my recent work has revolved around the distinction between participation and independence.
Employment statistics tell us who is working.
They do not tell us whether work enables independence.
Educational attainment tells us who has completed qualifications.
It does not tell us whether those qualifications created meaningful opportunity.
Income measures tell us what people earn.
They do not necessarily tell us how secure people feel or what degree of influence they possess over the shape of their own lives.
The reason this matters is that modern policy increasingly appears focused upon encouraging participation whilst paying much less attention to the quality of the outcomes that participation produces.
From that perspective, the proposal begins to raise uncomfortable questions. If a person is being encouraged towards a labour market that struggles to provide security, towards housing that feels increasingly unattainable, towards recruitment systems that seem to recognise credentials more easily than capability, and towards pathways whose outcomes appear progressively less certain, then the challenge may not reside entirely in their willingness to engage.
At the very least, it becomes difficult to separate the behaviour from the environment within which that behaviour emerges.
The Ecosystem of Intervention
Large programmes also possess another characteristic that receives remarkably little scrutiny. They create activity.
This is not criticism. It is simply an observation about the way modern institutions function.
A proposal of this scale immediately generates work. Delivery organisations expand. Local providers seek funding. Consultants are commissioned. Programme managers are appointed. Evaluation frameworks are developed. Targets are established. Reporting systems are created. Entire professional ecosystems begin organising themselves around the successful delivery of the intervention.
None of this is inherently problematic. Complex programmes require administration and oversight.
The question becomes whether the growth of activity is being mistaken for progress.
An observer looking at the resulting landscape would see movement everywhere. Meetings taking place. Contracts being awarded. Programmes being launched. Success measures being monitored. Communications teams publishing updates. Politicians announcing milestones.
The response becomes highly visible.
What remains much less visible is whether the conditions that produced the original problem are changing in any meaningful way.
The Politics of Hope
It is here that the language surrounding the proposal becomes particularly interesting.
Hope is one of the most frequently used words in public life and yet one of the least examined. Governments offer hope. Investments create hope. Initiatives restore hope. Entire political careers are built upon promises of hope.
Yet the experience itself seems far more elusive than the language used to describe it.
People rarely describe feeling hopeful because a programme exists. More often they describe feeling hopeful because the future appears accessible in a way that previously seemed impossible.
Hope emerges when opportunities become tangible rather than theoretical. It emerges when effort appears connected to outcomes. It emerges when individuals feel capable of influencing the direction of their own lives.
In that sense, hope behaves less like something that can be distributed and more like something that emerges from conditions.
Which raises an awkward possibility.
Political systems often talk about hope when what they are really offering is activity.
One is much easier to provide than the other.
The Conversation That Disappears
This is the point at which the £6 billion begins to resemble what political strategists sometimes call a dead cat. Not because the proposal is meaningless. Not because nobody benefits. Not because everyone involved is insincere.
It resembles a dead cat because of what it allows us to stop talking about.
Once the funding is announced, attention naturally shifts towards delivery. Public discussion becomes focused on implementation, targets, outcomes and measurement. The debate concerns whether the intervention works, whether enough money has been allocated and whether additional support may be required in the future.
Meanwhile the original question fades from view.
Why are so many young people arriving at adulthood unconvinced that the systems waiting for them provide a sufficiently attractive destination in the first place?
Why does the relationship between work and independence appear weaker than many people expected?
Why do qualifications appear increasingly disconnected from capability?
Why do growing numbers of people struggle to see a future that feels attainable despite doing the things society continues to ask of them?
Those questions are not easily solved through a programme. They cannot be managed through a delivery contract. They refuse to remain neatly inside departmental boundaries.
Yet there is a growing possibility that they are closer to the source of the problem than the disengagement we have become so focused upon measuring.
The Question Beneath the Question
Perhaps the most striking thing about the proposal is not the £6 billion itself, but the confidence with which a particular diagnosis has been accepted.
If the central problem is youth disengagement, then the proposal makes perfect sense.
If the central problem is a growing loss of faith in the destinations young people are being encouraged towards, the picture becomes considerably more complicated.
The difference between those two interpretations may seem subtle from a distance. In practice, it determines whether the policy is addressing the source of the problem or organising itself around its consequences.
And that distinction may ultimately prove more important than the money being spent. Because if the intervention succeeds politically by focusing attention on disengagement itself, there is a risk that the harder conversation about work, independence, capability, belonging and the future gets postponed once again.
Perhaps that is the real value of the £6 billion. Not as a solution, but as a lens through which to examine the assumptions society continues to make about why so many young people appear reluctant to follow the paths placed before them.
Whether those assumptions are still justified seems a question worth asking before we spend the money, not after it has gone.
Why the present inherits more than it chooses and shapes more than it can see
Introduction
As the results of the November 2026 United States midterm elections began to come in, I was listening to James Talarico’s appearance on The Diary of a CEO with Steven Bartlett. The interview had been recorded on 8 September, while Talarico was campaigning for the United States Senate in Texas. By the time I began writing, NBC News had projected his victory. Yet it was a reference to a much older document, rather than the election itself, that stayed with me.
The conversation ranged across affordability, inequality and the relationship between money and political power. During it, Talarico mentioned the Powell Memorandum. I had never heard of it. Curiosity, rather than agreement with any particular account of its influence, led me to read further.
What I found was a confidential memorandum written by Lewis F. Powell, Jr. on 23 August 1971 for Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., chair of the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Its title was Attack on American Free Enterprise System. Powell believed that business faced a broad challenge to its legitimacy and urged a more organised response. The document has since attracted sharply differing interpretations of its importance.
Initially, I thought I was investigating a memorandum. Then I noticed the date.
1971.
That year had appeared repeatedly in my own explorations of money, debt, institutions, governance and the relationship between people and systems. It seemed to sit near several changes that mattered to the world I was trying to understand. Finding it again made me wonder whether I had encountered an explanatory turning point: a place where the present might begin to make sense.
But there was a problem with that thought. Even if Powell’s memorandum had been extraordinarily influential, why had he written it? His concerns, his assumptions and the institutions through which he sought to act already had histories of their own.
What began as a question about one document became a question about the way I was reading history. Was I recognising a significant moment – or mistaking significance for a beginning?
These were consequential developments. Their proximity in time, however, does not establish that they shared a cause, formed a single programme or explain everything that followed. A date can organise an inquiry without answering it. I needed to distinguish what the historical record showed from the connections I was tempted to draw.
The appeal of an origin is easy to understand. It offers a place to begin the story and somewhere to locate responsibility. A document, an organisation or a decision can turn a complicated process into a sequence that feels manageable: first this happened, then the world changed.
Sometimes that is a useful simplification. Institutions have founding dates. Laws come into force. Decisions can close one route and open another. There is no need to deny these beginnings in order to question the larger claim that one of them marks the origin of the present.
The distinction is between the beginning of a particular arrangement and the beginning of all the conditions that made it possible. Powell could propose a strategy, but he did not create the business interests, educational institutions or political disputes to which he was responding. A new organisation can alter a debate without inventing the problems that brought its members together. Industrialisation can transform a society while drawing upon developments already underway.
Nor does an inherited context make an event merely a symptom. A turning point can accelerate a process, consolidate an advantage or produce a genuine break. The question is not whether it mattered, but how it mattered: what it changed, what it carried forward and what would plausibly have happened without it.
The history of Bretton Woods offers a concrete reminder. Nixon’s decision was dramatic, but the pressures behind it were not new. The Federal Reserve’s account describes years of attempts to defend the dollar and sustain confidence in gold convertibility. Even after August 1971, governments tried to preserve fixed exchange rates through the Smithsonian Agreement. The transition continued into 1973. A moment that looks decisive in retrospect was also one stage in a prolonged struggle to maintain, then replace, an inherited arrangement.
This did not make 1971 less interesting. It made my question more precise. Rather than looking for the moment everything started, I began asking which processes became visible there – and how choices made within them could influence a future nobody could fully know.
Direction Without Design
If no single event supplies an absolute origin, why do some historical patterns persist? Why can institutions, incentives and familiar ways of thinking survive the people who established them?
By direction, I do not mean that history has one purpose or moves inevitably towards one destination. I mean something more limited: a recognisable tendency within a particular process. A system can repeatedly favour certain choices without everyone participating in it agreeing about the outcome.
There is a temptation to treat that consistency as evidence of comprehensive design. If similar interests benefit repeatedly, perhaps someone must have planned the whole result. Yet the alternative is not to insist that everything happened by accident. Between a finished blueprint and pure chance lies a world of deliberate decisions, inherited constraints, competing interests and unforeseen consequences.
A blueprint specifies a destination. A trajectory describes a course whose destination may remain unknown. The distinction is useful, but it must not become an excuse to ignore actual planning. People organise, exercise power and pursue long – term goals. The absence of complete foresight neither disproves coordination nor diminishes the influence of those with the resources to act.
Likewise, inheriting a world does not mean inheriting an equal share of power over it. A business leader, a policymaker and a worker may all operate within existing institutions, but their ability to change those institutions can differ greatly. Any account of historical direction needs to ask whose choices count, whose interests are protected and whose objections are excluded.
What inheritance helps explain is why even deliberate strategies do not operate on a blank canvas. People act through institutions that already exist, using concepts and expectations they did not invent. Their plans interact with other plans, with resistance and with circumstances beyond their control. The eventual result can differ from the intentions of every participant.
Continuity can also arise without renewed commitment to the original purpose. An arrangement becomes easier to extend than to replace. Skills, resources and expectations accumulate around it. Later decisions are made within the possibilities it has created, and those decisions may reinforce its course even when the people making them have different ambitions.
This is a way of understanding persistence, not a law that makes change impossible. Institutions can fail. Assumptions can be challenged. Political struggles can redirect a process. The fact that a route has been travelled does not mean it must be followed indefinitely.
History, viewed this way, is neither an elaborate plan executed across generations nor a collection of unrelated accidents. Its larger patterns can emerge from choices that are intentional in their immediate purposes but incomplete in their understanding of what comes next.
The question then becomes more concrete. What connects those choices across time? What do people inherit that makes some possibilities seem sensible, others impractical and others almost unthinkable?
What Gets Passed Forward?
Ideas, policies and institutions are part of the answer. But the thread I found most useful was the assumption: a judgement about how the world works, or what matters within it, that helps determine which decisions appear reasonable.
Some assumptions are stated openly and defended. Others are embedded in rules, incentives and routines. They are not necessarily unconscious, and they are not necessarily wrong. Their importance lies in how easily they can become the starting point of a decision rather than its subject.
Consider a hypothetical institution that judges success principally by the volume of work completed. Initially, this may be a practical response to a backlog. It then designs its reporting around volume, rewards staff for increasing it and allocates resources accordingly. New managers inherit those measures and use them to demonstrate improvement. Eventually, the question “Are we completing more?” can displace the question “Are we completing the right things well?”
No one needs to have intended that displacement. The original measure may have served a legitimate purpose. But once it shapes reporting, rewards and resources, it begins to structure the choices of people who were not involved in selecting it. An assumption about what counts as success has acquired institutional consequences.
The example is illustrative, not evidence about a particular organisation. It shows the mechanism I have in mind: a judgement becomes a rule; the rule shapes behaviour; the resulting behaviour makes the judgement seem natural. Later participants encounter not just an idea, but a working environment built around it.
Such continuity need not depend on universal agreement. Someone may question a measure and still be required to report against it. A policymaker may doubt an inherited arrangement while finding its replacement costly or politically difficult. What persists is not always a belief held equally by everyone, but the influence of a belief already built into the terms of participation.
This also complicates the distinction between an assumption and the reality it helped create. If an institution consistently rewards one kind of behaviour, people adapt to it. Their adaptation can then be presented as proof that the institution was responding to human nature all along. An outcome partly produced by a rule becomes a reason to keep the rule.
That possibility is why examining assumptions matters. It asks us to distinguish necessity from familiarity, evidence from convention and an arrangement’s present effects from its original justification. It also reminds us that inheritance is selective. People resist, reinterpret and discard what they receive; continuity is something to explain, not simply presume.
My interest in the Powell Memorandum changed at this point. Rather than asking it to explain the whole subsequent world, I wanted to see which assumptions it expressed, how they supported its recommendations and what evidence would be needed to trace their later influence.
The Powell Memorandum Revisited
Returning to Powell’s memorandum, I could see more clearly why it had caught my attention. It records both an interpretation of the world and a proposal to act upon that interpretation.
Its opening presents the American economic system as being under broad attack. Powell’s concern extends beyond explicitly revolutionary opponents to criticism from universities, the media, religious institutions and other established parts of society. These are Powell’s assessments, not neutral descriptions that a reader must accept. Their value for this inquiry is that they make his premises visible.
For Powell, defending the enterprise system was an urgent task. From that premise followed the case for an organised business response. The movement from diagnosis to action is the important point: what he believed was threatened shaped what he thought should be done.
It would therefore be misleading to say the memorandum was only a snapshot and not a plan. It was a snapshot of assumptions expressed through a strategic intervention. Deliberate action and historical inheritance coexist within the same document. The question is how far that intervention reached, not whether intention was present.
That gives us evidence of circulation and of implementation as reported by the Chamber. It does not, by itself, establish the memorandum as the cause of everything later associated with corporate political influence. Similarities between a recommendation and a later development require investigation: who adopted it, through which institution, with what resources, and alongside what other influences?
Hindsight can illuminate consequences, but it can also make intentions look more comprehensive than they were. The fact that later events resemble an earlier proposal does not mean its author foresaw their full form. Equally, the absence of such foresight does not make the proposal harmless or irrelevant.
For me, the memorandum became a waypoint rather than an absolute origin: a place where a particular set of assumptions and ambitions can be inspected. Its importance need not rest on its ability to explain the whole road. It can help us understand one consequential attempt to influence the route.
And that is what makes it uncomfortable to read. The people of the past do not have a monopoly on assumptions that seem reasonable from within their own moment. Reading theirs raises a question about ours.
The Future Has No Vote
It is easier to notice an assumption once we can see some of its consequences. A historical document lets us compare what its author believed with what later happened. We have no equivalent vantage point from which to inspect the full consequences of our own decisions.
That limitation should encourage humility, but not moral indifference. Understanding the circumstances in which people acted does not settle whether their actions were justified. A person can inherit an assumption, sincerely believe it and still be responsible for how it is used. Nor must a decision’s consequences be wholly unforeseeable simply because its most distant effects remain unknown.
The task is to distinguish what could reasonably have been recognised at the time from what becomes apparent only afterwards. Who warned of a risk? Whose experience challenged the prevailing account? What alternatives were available? These questions preserve responsibility without granting historical actors knowledge they could not have possessed.
They also prevent a reflective account of history from becoming too generous to power. Saying that everyone operates within inherited conditions is true of both those who impose a decision and those who bear its costs. It does not erase the difference between them.
The thought that kept returning to me was this:
The dead cannot answer.
The future has no vote.
The first line names a limit of historical interpretation. We can examine surviving records, compare accounts and challenge conclusions, but we cannot ask those who are gone to respond. Their silence should not become permission to assign them either perfect foresight or motives unsupported by evidence.
The second names a problem of responsibility. People not yet born cannot participate in today’s decisions, although they may live with their consequences. The future is not entirely absent from public discussion – people can argue on its behalf – but its eventual inhabitants cannot tell us directly what they need.
Between those two limits sits the present. We inherit consequences we did not choose, and we contribute to consequences others will not have chosen. That does not require us to predict everything. It does require us to take the limits of our perspective seriously.
Perhaps the most useful way to think about this is as navigation rather than the construction of a finished destination. We must choose a route without knowing every condition ahead. Good judgement then involves more than confidence in our current map. It involves listening to those who encounter different terrain, noticing when evidence contradicts our expectations and preserving the ability to change course.
For me, that gives the inquiry a practical edge. What do our institutions count as success? Which costs fall outside their measures? Whose interests are treated as obstacles rather than evidence? Which arrangements do we call inevitable because we have become accustomed to them? And how readily could those who follow us revise the choices we are making?
These questions do not guarantee better answers. But they make assumptions available for examination before they harden into the terms on which everyone else must act. They move responsibility beyond the search for a culprit in the past and towards scrutiny of the choices available now.
History cannot place us outside the process. It can only help us recognise our position within it.
Nobody Arrives at the Beginning
One thought continued to return throughout this inquiry. Whenever I believed I had found a starting point, it proved to be another stage.
The Powell Memorandum responded to circumstances that already existed. So did Bretton Woods, industrialisation and the Fabian Society. The deeper I looked, the harder it became to find anyone standing at the beginning of the road. Instead, I found people joining a process already underway.
This distinction changes how responsibility appears. Historical narratives encourage us to search for the decisive person, document or decision: the point at which somebody understood what was happening and set everything else in motion. Real life rarely offers such clarity.
The people living through 1971 did not experience it as a completed historical period. They faced uncertainty, disagreement and incomplete information, just as we do. The same was true of those who drafted constitutions, built institutions or designed economic systems. They were not standing outside history and directing it from above. They were responding to the circumstances they could see.
Perhaps that is the value of a historical milestone. It need not begin a process to make that process visible.
The Powell Memorandum is one such moment. It records assumptions while they were still being stated and defended. It captures people attempting to influence a future they could not see, allowing us to observe historical direction from within rather than only through its consequences.
Every generation enters the story in the middle. It inherits assumptions it did not create, mistakes some of them for reality and contributes something of its own. In doing so, it leaves the road different from the way it found it.
The people who came before us never possessed the complete picture.
Neither do we.
Conclusion: Standing in the Middle
The Powell Memorandum did not provide the beginning I had gone looking for. It provided something more useful: a view of people acting within history rather than outside it.
The dead cannot answer.
The future has no vote.
Between those limits lies our responsibility: not to stand outside history and explain it once and for all, but to participate in it with greater care. We cannot know the whole destination, but we can question the assumptions guiding our route and preserve room for those who follow to choose differently.
Future generations may see limitations in our assumptions that remain difficult for us to recognise. They may ask how we mistook a particular arrangement for the way the world had to be. We cannot supply their answer in advance. We can begin by asking the question ourselves.
Sources and Notes
This is a reflective essay, not a comprehensive history of corporate influence or monetary change. The historical sources below support its factual frame; the broader argument about inheritance, assumptions and responsibility is an interpretation. Temporal proximity is not offered as proof of a shared cause. The institutional example in “What Gets Passed Forward?” is hypothetical.
Can Meaningful Change Still Be Delivered Today? began with a practical question rather than a predetermined conclusion.
The purpose of the inquiry was not to advocate for a particular political ideology, governance model or economic system. Nor was it intended to prove that meaningful change was impossible.
Instead, the objective was to examine a deceptively simple question:
Can meaningful change still be delivered today?
If meaningful improvements remain possible within the systems we already inhabit, what is helping or preventing them from being realised?
What began as a search for practical reform gradually became an investigation into recurring patterns that appeared across governance, public services, organisations, communities and wider society.
Along the way, the inquiry explored the relationships between incentives, responsibility, authority, value, capability, judgement and human agency.
This document provides a concise overview of the journey, the major discoveries and the questions that remained.
The Central Question
The entire inquiry revolves around a single question:
Can meaningful change still be delivered today?
Not after a crisis.
Not after the collapse of existing institutions.
Not after the emergence of an entirely new system.
Today.
Within the structures and systems that already exist.
The investigation deliberately adopted a constraint:
Rather than beginning with assumptions about what should replace existing systems, it would first examine whether meaningful improvement remained possible within them.
The Journey of Discovery
The inquiry unfolded through a series of discoveries.
Initially, the focus was on identifying practical routes to meaningful reform. Instead of finding straightforward solutions, recurring patterns began to emerge.
Problems that appeared unrelated often seemed to share surprisingly similar characteristics.
This led to a series of discoveries that gradually formed a coherent framework.
Cost Externalisation
The first major discovery was that many problems do not disappear. Their consequences simply move elsewhere.
Costs are often transferred:
Into the future
Onto other organisations
Into communities
Onto individuals with little influence over the original decision
This pattern became known as Cost Externalisation.
The key insight was simple:
Problems are often not solved. Their consequences are merely redistributed.
Human Value Externalisation
The next stage of the inquiry explored the gap between what systems measure and what people actually value.
Many of the things people consider most important are difficult to quantify:
Trust
Community
Belonging
Security
Dignity
Purpose
These things remain important regardless of whether they appear in institutional measures.
This became known as Human Value Externalisation.
The central observation was that value can remain present while becoming increasingly invisible to the systems intended to recognise it.
Capability Externalisation
The inquiry then turned to capability.
Repeatedly, situations emerged in which genuine capability existed but was poorly recognised or utilised.
At the same time, proxies for capability increasingly influenced opportunity and recognition.
Examples included:
Qualifications
Credentials
Status
Formal indicators of competence
This pattern became known as Capability Externalisation.
The inquiry challenged the assumption that capability and recognised capability are always the same thing.
The Role of Proxies
The discovery that connected earlier observations was the role of proxies.
A proxy is a representation of reality rather than reality itself.
Examples include:
Targets
Metrics
Qualifications
Performance indicators
Reports
Proxies are necessary.
Modern systems could not function without them.
The challenge emerges when proxies become more important than the realities they were created to represent.
Proxy Authority
As the role of proxies became clearer, another discovery followed.
Proxies do not merely represent reality.
They also influence behaviour.
Targets shape priorities.
Metrics shape incentives.
Performance indicators shape decisions.
This influence became known as Proxy Authority.
Proxy Sovereignty
The inquiry then explored what happens when this influence continues to grow.
Under certain conditions, systems begin to organise themselves around measures and representations rather than the purposes they were originally created to serve.
This became known as Proxy Sovereignty.
The defining characteristic is that the proxy effectively becomes more important than the reality it was created to represent.
Judgement Displacement
The concept that ultimately became central to the framework was Judgement Displacement.
Modern institutions increasingly emphasise:
Compliance
Consistency
Process
Targets
Risk management
These things may provide benefits.
However, they can also reduce opportunities for human judgement.
The inquiry suggests that many systems increasingly reward adherence to representation rather than interpretation of reality.
The consequence is that judgement becomes constrained, displaced or transferred elsewhere.
Authority and Responsibility
The inquiry repeatedly uncovered a growing separation between authority and responsibility.
Responsibility often remains attached to individuals.
Authority increasingly becomes embedded within systems, procedures, frameworks and proxies.
This can create situations in which people remain accountable for outcomes while possessing diminishing influence over them.
The implications for meaningful change are substantial.
Destination States
The concept of Destination States emerged as the inquiry turned towards future implications.
Destination States are not predictions.
They are logical end points toward which systems appear to move when existing incentives remain unchanged.
The purpose of the concept is not to forecast events.
It is to help identify the direction of travel.
Understanding direction may often matter more than predicting specific outcomes.
Agency
The final stage of the inquiry focused on people.
Meaningful change ultimately depends on meaningful agency.
Agency is defined as the practical ability of individuals and communities to influence the outcomes affecting their lives.
This became one of the most important conclusions of the investigation.
Without agency, adaptation becomes increasingly difficult.
Without adaptation, meaningful change becomes increasingly constrained.
The Core Framework
The inquiry produced a connected sequence of discoveries:
Cost Externalisation
Human Value Externalisation
Capability Externalisation
Proxies
Proxy Authority
Proxy Sovereignty
Judgement Displacement
Authority and Responsibility
Agency
Together these concepts describe a process through which systems can become progressively detached from the realities they were created to serve.
What the Book Does Not Claim
The book does not claim that:
Meaningful change is impossible
Collapse is inevitable
One political ideology provides all the answers
A single group or institution is responsible for every problem examined
A perfect system exists
Instead, the inquiry seeks to understand the conditions that make meaningful change either easier or more difficult to achieve.
Key Takeaways
1. Many Problems May Share Common Dynamics
Problems that appear unrelated may be connected by underlying systemic patterns.
2. Representation Can Become More Influential Than Reality
The systems used to represent reality can gradually become more important than reality itself.
3. Judgement Remains Essential
Human judgement continues to play a critical role wherever reality exceeds the capacity of systems to represent it fully.
4. Authority and Responsibility Matter
When authority and responsibility become separated, accountability and adaptation become increasingly difficult.
5. Agency Matters
Meaningful change depends upon the ability of people and communities to influence outcomes.
6. Direction Matters More Than Prediction
The inquiry is concerned less with forecasting events and more with understanding trajectories.
7. Understanding Comes Before Reform
Before meaningful change can occur, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms creating current outcomes.
The Unresolved Question
Although the inquiry began as a question about change, it ultimately arrived at a deeper question about agency.
One possibility emerged repeatedly throughout the investigation:
What if the greatest challenge is not accepting responsibility for others, but accepting the agency of others as equal to our own?
The inquiry does not claim to answer that question.
It simply arrived there.
Conclusion
Can Meaningful Change Still Be Delivered Today? does not offer certainty.
It offers a framework.
A way of recognising recurring patterns.
A way of examining the relationship between systems, institutions, communities and individuals.
A way of thinking about adaptation, responsibility, authority and change.
The inquiry began with a practical question.
It ended with a deeper understanding of why that question may be far more difficult, and far more important, than it first appears.
Can meaningful change still be delivered today?
The answer may depend less upon what we believe and more upon what we are prepared to recognise, understand and act upon while the opportunity still exists.
Why the debate about ending forty years of neoliberalism may be missing the point
A Curious Reaction
When Andy Burnham first began talking about ending forty years of neoliberalism, I expected disagreement. Political ideas that touch something substantial almost always provoke a reaction.
What surprised me was not the fact that people argued about it, but the way they argued about it. Within a remarkably short period of time, the conversation seemed to settle into familiar territory.
Supporters presented the idea as a long-overdue recognition of Britain’s failures. Critics responded as though they were hearing an argument for returning to the 1970s. The disagreement was immediate, energetic and entirely predictable.
What interested me was something else.
The entire discussion appeared to assume that everybody already knew what the phrase meant. More than that, it assumed that everybody knew where the boundaries of the debate lay.
The disagreement was not over whether the phrase described reality, but over whether leaving that reality would be desirable.
The argument became a choice between continuation and reversal. We were either remaining on the path set in motion during the Thatcher years or attempting to retrace our steps back to an earlier model.
The possibility that neither description accurately captured the moment we are living through barely appeared.
That omission is worth dwelling on because it points toward a question that feels increasingly important.
How would anybody recognise the end of an era while they were still living inside it?
The Strange Journey of Political Language
Political systems are constantly searching for language that captures things people can already feel but struggle to describe. Most books never reach beyond their audience. Most detailed arguments remain where they begin. What tends to travel are phrases.
A phrase can migrate from essays into newspaper columns, from newspaper columns into think-tank reports, from think-tank reports into speeches and from speeches into everyday conversation.
The more successful the phrase, the further it travels.
What is interesting is that understanding rarely travels at the same speed.
By the time a useful phrase reaches the centre of political discourse, it has often become detached from the intellectual framework that produced it. Different people begin using it for different purposes. It stops functioning as an explanation and starts functioning as a signal. It becomes useful because it conveys a mood, a direction of travel or a sense that something important is happening.
That does not mean everybody using the phrase understands the same thing.
In fact, it often means the opposite.
The phrase survives precisely because different groups can pour different meanings into it.
This may be one reason the language of “forty years of neoliberalism” has been so successful. The phrase clearly touches a nerve. It captures a widespread feeling that something about Britain’s trajectory deserves re-examination. What remains far less clear is whether there is equal agreement about what is actually being described.
When Systems Disappear
Part of the difficulty lies in the way successful systems evolve.
Most people think of neoliberalism as a collection of policies. Privatisation. Deregulation. Globalisation. Financialisation. Depending on who is speaking, those developments either saved Britain or hollowed it out. Entire political careers have been built around defending or attacking those changes.
Yet policies are only the visible layer of a system.
The deeper layer is the collection of assumptions that develops around them.
What counts as economic success. What counts as competence. Which institutions matter. Which risks deserve attention. What questions can be asked. Which outcomes are considered realistic.
At first those assumptions are visible because people remember alternatives. Over time they become harder to see. New generations inherit them. Institutions are organised around them. Political careers are built within them. Eventually they stop appearing as assumptions and start appearing as reality.
The system disappears from view precisely because it becomes normal.
That is why I have always preferred thinking in terms of operating systems rather than ideologies.
People know they are choosing between ideologies.
They rarely realise they are working inside an operating system.
The Water Fish Cannot See
The old phrase about fish being unable to see water survives because it captures something profoundly human.
We are very good at adapting to our environment. In fact, we are so good at it that we often stop noticing the environment altogether.
The process is visible everywhere.
People adapt to fragility.
Institutions adapt to constraints.
Political parties adapt to assumptions.
Entire societies adapt to conditions that previous generations might have regarded as extraordinary.
Eventually the adaptation becomes so complete that the thing shaping behaviour vanishes into the background.
The fish sees the currents, the movement and the consequences. The fish does not see the water.
This is why discussions about political change often feel strangely unsatisfying. Politicians can spend hours arguing about policy while sharing assumptions they no longer recognise as assumptions. Journalists can write thousands of words about reform while accepting the framework within which reform is constrained. Economists can debate outcomes while rarely examining the environment producing them.
This is not evidence of stupidity.
It is evidence of immersion.
Why the Debate Feels Incomplete
The more I listened to the discussion surrounding the end of forty years of neoliberalism, the more I found myself wondering whether the debate was unfolding at the wrong level.
The assumption seemed to be that people stand outside the system, evaluate it and then choose whether to continue it.
But what if that is not how systems work?
What if people are shaped by an operating environment long before they start questioning it?
Viewed through that lens, the interesting question is not whether a political movement wishes to move beyond neoliberalism.
The interesting question is whether anybody can clearly see the assumptions they inherited from it.
That challenge becomes particularly difficult when those assumptions have become embedded within ideas that appear self-evident. Growth. Productivity. Competitiveness. Confidence. Credibility.
These concepts are treated as neutral descriptions of reality. Rarely are they examined as products of a particular way of understanding reality.
The water has become invisible.
Sensing an Ending
This is one reason I find the current moment so fascinating.
For several years I have argued that Britain’s operating model appears to be reaching the end of its natural life. Not because somebody decided it should end, but because the conditions that sustained it are changing. The issue is not morality. It is fit.
Operating systems work because they fit the environment in which they emerge. They begin to struggle when the environment changes faster than the assumptions embedded within them.
What strikes me today is how many institutions appear to be sensing this shift.
The language has changed.
The confidence has changed.
The mood has changed.
People speak increasingly about resilience, security, sovereignty, capability and exposure. Themes that sat comfortably in the background for decades have moved closer to the centre of public debate.
Something is clearly being felt.
Whether it is fully understood is another question.
History suggests that people often experience the sensation of transition before they understand its cause. They feel the edge of an era long before they can describe it.
The Language of Maintenance
This is partly why the recent Budget interested me.
What stood out was not a particular policy but a tone.
Much of the language revolved around creating “breathing space”, managing pressures and helping households navigate difficult circumstances. Even the temporary tax surcharge on banks was presented in terms of short-term support rather than long-term transformation.
The emphasis repeatedly returned to stability, discipline, confidence and the need to navigate a difficult external environment.
None of this is inherently unreasonable. Yet it has a particular flavour.
It is the language of maintenance. The language of holding things together. The language of preserving stability while a system encounters pressures for which it was not originally designed.
That does not mean the people using that language are wrong. It simply raises an interesting possibility.
Perhaps many of the actors discussing the end of an era are simultaneously operating within the assumptions of that era.
Not because they are trapped. But because they have never known anything else.
Missing the Point
This brings us back to the original phrase.
The debate about ending forty years of neoliberalism often assumes that the central question is whether neoliberalism succeeded or failed.
I am increasingly persuaded that a deeper question sits underneath it.
What if the most significant issue is not whether an era is ending, but whether we are capable of recognising the operating system that shaped the era in the first place?
The difference matters.
One debate concerns policies. The other concerns perception.
One asks what should happen next. The other asks whether we fully understand where we are standing now.
Those are not the same thing.
The Ground Beneath Our Feet
The most successful operating systems are not the ones people passionately defend. They are the ones people stop noticing.
The assumptions become common sense. The framework becomes reality. The environment becomes invisible.
At that point, even criticism of the system may continue speaking its language.
That is why I find the current moment so intriguing.
Not because I know what comes next.
Not because I am convinced anybody else does either.
But because more and more people seem to be sensing that something is changing beneath their feet.
The phrase “forty years of neoliberalism” may be evidence of that feeling. The argument surrounding it may be evidence too.
The question is not whether the era is ending.
It is whether we can see the water clearly enough to understand the thing that shaped us before it disappears.
I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the realities of the minimum wage and what this benchmark actually represents.
The biggest misconception surrounding the National Minimum Wage is the widespread assumption that it bears some meaningful relationship to the cost of living. It doesn’t.
Somewhere along the way, we began treating the minimum wage as though it were a measure of what it costs to live independently, build financial security, and participate fully in society. It was never designed to be any of those things.
Yet each increase is inevitably presented as evidence of progress, a sign that government understands the pressures facing ordinary people, whilst employers often use it as a benchmark to justify the legitimacy of their own pay structures.
The reality is that the minimum wage remains far below the level that many people require to live independently without relying on debt, family support, benefits and welfare, or a combination of all three.
That matters because independence is the issue at the heart of the wider debate.
In recent months I have written about what poverty really is and why small businesses are struggling. Whilst those may appear to be separate conversations, they are in fact different manifestations of the same underlying problem.
The minimum wage debate provides perhaps the clearest example of how disconnected our understanding of that problem has become.
Poverty Begins Where Independence Ends
The way poverty is commonly discussed tends to focus on income alone.
We talk about poverty lines, earnings thresholds, and household statistics. We compare one figure against another and decide whether someone falls above or below a particular measure.
But poverty is not fundamentally about numbers.
Poverty begins where independence ends.
A person enters poverty when they can no longer meet their essential needs without external support. Whether that support comes from the state, from family members, from charities, or from borrowing money that will eventually need to be repaid, the outcome is essentially the same. Independence has been lost.
This is why so much of the debate surrounding wages misses the point.
If someone receives a higher hourly wage but still cannot afford housing, energy, transport, food, insurance, and the basic costs of modern life without additional support, have we actually solved anything?
Or have we simply moved the numbers whilst leaving the underlying condition untouched?
The uncomfortable reality is that increasing numbers of people are discovering just how fragile their own independence has become. A redundancy, an illness, a rent increase, a mortgage rate adjustment, or an unexpected expense can rapidly expose how little resilience exists beneath the surface.
The minimum wage may rise.
The insecurity remains.
The Problem Facing Small Businesses is the Same Problem Facing Workers
The political framing of minimum wage debates often creates the impression that there are two opposing sides.
On one side are workers who quite understandably need higher wages.
On the other are businesses that supposedly do not want to pay them.
The reality is rarely that simple.
Most people earning the minimum wage need more money.
Most small businesses are already struggling to survive.
Both statements can be true at the same time.
The reason is that workers and small businesses are often facing different symptoms of the same underlying pressures.
Workers need higher wages because the cost of living has become increasingly unaffordable.
Small businesses struggle to pay higher wages because they are operating on margins that become thinner every year.
Neither side created the conditions that produced this situation.
For decades, economic value has become increasingly concentrated amongst larger organisations with greater market power, easier access to capital, and the ability to operate at scales that smaller competitors simply cannot match.
At the same time, communities have become less economically resilient. Housing costs have risen. Living costs have risen. Debt has grown. Disposable income has shrunk.
Consumers buy differently because they have to.
Small businesses operate differently because they have to.
The local shop owner trying to meet payroll and the employee struggling to pay rent are frequently experiencing different consequences of the same economic architecture.
Yet public debate encourages them to see one another as the problem.
Why Minimum Wage Rises are Politically Attractive
The argument here is not that minimum wages should not increase.
They should.
The lowest-paid members of society deserve better compensation for their work and contribution.
The problem is that minimum wage policy is increasingly being presented as a solution to issues that are far bigger than wages alone.
For governments, minimum wage increases possess obvious political advantages.
They are visible.
They are measurable.
They create clear headlines.
They allow politicians to demonstrate action.
What they do not do is address the deeper causes of economic dependency.
Raising the minimum wage does nothing to reduce the cost of housing.
It does nothing to tackle the underlying drivers of energy prices.
It does nothing to confront the growing concentration of market power.
It does nothing to resolve the increasing cost of raising families.
It does nothing to address the structural conditions that leave both workers and businesses struggling for survival.
Instead, it attempts to compensate for those pressures after they have already been created.
And in doing so it risks becoming another temporary intervention in a system that continues to generate the same outcomes.
The Ground Beneath Us is Still Sinking
On paper, a significant increase in the minimum wage can look generous, particularly at a time when governments are themselves struggling to balance competing financial pressures.
But appearances can be deceptive.
Large corporations may absorb increased wage costs for a period before finding ways to pass them on through higher prices, improved efficiencies, reduced staffing levels, or increased productivity demands.
Small businesses often have far fewer options.
Many will absorb the costs and accept lower profits.
Others will attempt to raise prices in markets that are already stretched beyond comfort.
Some will simply close.
Meanwhile, those receiving the wage increase may discover that rising rents, rising bills, rising insurance costs, and rising prices steadily erode much of the benefit that was intended.
Everyone moves.
Very few move forward.
This is why the minimum wage debate often feels strangely circular. Every year we now find ourselves having the same conversation once again.
The minimum wage must rise because people cannot afford to live.
Yet people increasingly cannot afford to live despite repeated rises in the minimum wage.
At what point do we stop discussing the symptom and start discussing the cause?
The Real Question
The question is not whether the minimum wage should rise.
The question is why it has to keep rising simply to prevent more people from falling behind.
If full-time work cannot reliably provide economic independence, the problem is not the minimum wage itself.
If small businesses are becoming less viable whilst workers remain financially insecure, the problem is not either side of the employment relationship.
If governments repeatedly return to minimum wage increases as one of their primary responses to economic hardship, the problem is not necessarily the intention.
The problem may lie in the architecture itself.
Modern poverty, struggling small businesses, and constant debates about wages are not separate crises.
They are different warnings emerging from the same system.
And until we start questioning the structure that produces those warnings, every increase in the minimum wage, however well-intentioned, risks becoming another step forward on ground that is still sinking beneath us.
Further Reading
1. The Independence Threshold: A New Definition of Poverty for a Modern Economy
Before discussing wages, it is worth understanding what poverty actually is. This article argues that poverty begins where independence ends, proposing a definition based not on arbitrary income thresholds but on a person’s ability to sustain themselves without relying on external support. It provides the conceptual foundation for understanding why rising wages alone do not necessarily solve poverty.
If poverty is ultimately about dependency, what creates that dependency? This article explores the structural forces that increasingly undermine economic independence, from rising living costs and housing pressures to the broader systems that leave more people vulnerable despite living in a wealthy society. It examines the architecture that produces poverty rather than simply its visible symptoms.
3. Why Small Businesses Are Struggling – And Why the Real Problem Runs Much Deeper Than Anyone Wants to Admit
The same pressures affecting individuals are also affecting local businesses. This article argues that the challenges facing small businesses cannot be explained solely by taxes, labour costs, energy prices, or regulation. Instead, they are part of a much deeper economic shift that increasingly concentrates advantage amongst larger organisations whilst leaving smaller firms and communities with diminishing resilience.
Together, these articles explore a common theme: that modern poverty, economic dependency, struggling small businesses, and the continuing debate over wages are not separate problems. They are different manifestations of the same underlying economic architecture.