England is undergoing a constitutional transformation of unusual scale and significance. Under the banner of “devolution,” political leaders – most prominently Andy Burnham – are advancing a model that appears to empower regions but may, in practice, centralise authority at a higher tier, away from the most immediate and accessible forms of local democracy.

This is not a partisan project; politicians across the spectrum have expressed interest in similar reforms. But its implications for democratic legitimacy, local representation, and constitutional balance are profound.

What is emerging is not devolution in the traditional sense. It is regional centralisation: the consolidation of power into larger, higher-tier executive bodies that sit above existing councils, accompanied by the quiet removal or hollowing out of the lower tiers of government that citizens interact with most directly.

Crucially, this transformation is proceeding without a clear, direct mandate from the public.

The argument is not for preserving the current system unchanged, but for reform that deepens local accountability rather than bypassing it. Genuine devolution would move authority downward – to parish, town, district, and borough levels – granting councils meaningful fiscal autonomy and policy discretion within broad national frameworks.

The Disappearing Layers of Local Democracy

Most people are unaware of how many layers of local government currently represent them.

In much of England, people have:

• Parish or town councils, handling hyper‑local matters such as parks, community centres, and neighbourhood issues.

• District or borough councils, responsible for housing, planning applications, waste collection, and local services.

• County councils, overseeing education, social care, highways, libraries, and major infrastructure.

This multi‑layered system reflects the principle of subsidiarity: decisions should be made at the lowest possible level, closest to the people they affect. It provides multiple democratic access points, enabling residents to contact representatives who live nearby, understand local issues, and are accountable to small electorates.

Yet these layers are increasingly vulnerable to being reduced, merged, or bypassed. The shift toward unitary authorities and combined regional structures can replace large numbers of locally elected councillors with a smaller number of higher-tier decision-makers.

Accessibility shrinks, accountability thins, and decision-making moves further away from communities.

This is not administrative tidying.

It risks removing some of the most accessible forms of democracy.

Why Local Councils Already Feel Arbitrary – and Why That Matters

This loss is not always immediately visible. One reason it is easy to overlook is that many people already feel disconnected from their local councils.

Planning decisions, licensing rules, and other supposedly “local” policies often feel arbitrary or unresponsive. But this is not because councils are inherently flawed; it is because much of their power has already been stripped away.

Over the past two decades, local authorities have increasingly operated as delivery arms for central policy, rather than as fully autonomous democratic bodies.

In areas such as planning, licensing, housing, and social care, councils frequently:

• interpret national frameworks rather than create their own,

• implement centrally defined targets within strict statutory guidance,

• and make decisions constrained by national funding formulas.

This hollowing-out has helped create the impression that local government is ineffective or irrelevant. In reality, many councils have been significantly constrained by central policy, statutory obligations, and funding arrangements.

Regional centralisation now risks removing what remains.

Some may argue that if councils already feel powerless, their abolition is no great loss. But this misunderstands the problem. England’s democratic malaise stems from too much power already being held at the centre.

The remedy is not to remove even more local autonomy, nor to dismantle the structures that facilitate it. The remedy is to restore genuine local power, not to eliminate it.

Regional Executives: Power Upwards, Not Downwards

The emerging model concentrates authority in large, combined authorities led by regional executives. These bodies already oversee, or are being positioned to oversee, areas such as transport, housing, skills, infrastructure, and potentially wider fiscal powers.

They are designed to be strategic and streamlined – but streamlining comes at a democratic cost.

Where multiple tiers of local representation are replaced or subordinated to a higher regional executive, several consequences may follow:

• People may have fewer directly accessible representatives.

• Decision‑makers become more distant.

• Local dissent may carry less institutional weight.

• Party machinery may gain greater influence over candidate selection.

• Central government may face fewer local veto points.

This is why the term regional centralisation is so important.

Power is not being devolved to neighbourhoods or communities. It is being consolidated into larger units that are easier to manage from the centre.

As governance becomes more distant, electoral participation and civic engagement may weaken further, reinforcing the perception that local democracy is symbolic rather than meaningful.

A Constitutional Change Without Public Consent

The most serious issue is not merely structural; it is constitutional.

Changes of this magnitude alter the relationship between people and the state. They redefine how democracy functions and reshape the architecture of representation.

Yet England’s electorate has not been asked whether it wants:

• the abolition of district and county councils,

• the creation of regional executives with sweeping powers,

• new layers of governance with tax‑raising authority,

• or a restructured democratic system that reduces local access.

These reforms have not been clearly set out as a comprehensive constitutional settlement in recent national manifestos. They have not been subject to sustained public debate or submitted to referendum. Instead, they are largely being advanced through administrative and legislative pathways: secondary legislation, funding agreements, centrally negotiated devolution deals, and institutional restructuring rather than direct electoral mandates.

The constitutional principle is simple:

Consent in this context does not require unanimity, but it does require clear public awareness and an explicit opportunity to approve or reject change.

As a democratic principle, reforms of this scale can only claim legitimacy without a public vote where they clearly return power to people – not where they remove or distance it.

Regional centralisation does the latter while presenting itself as the former.

Historical Context: England Has Rejected This Before

This is not the first attempt to reorganise England into regional units.

During the early 2000s, the Blair government – in which Burnham served as a minister – supported proposals for elected regional assemblies in England. Wales and Scotland accepted their own forms of devolution; England did not follow the same path. In the North East, a referendum was held, and voters decisively rejected an elected regional assembly.

That earlier process, whatever its flaws, respected democratic norms. It asked the public. It held plebiscites. It acknowledged that constitutional change requires consent.

Today’s process does not.

A comparable regional logic is now being revived, but without referendums, without equivalent transparency, and without comparable public debate.

The electorate is being asked to accept institutional change after the fact, even though the principle at stake remains similar: who governs England, and at what level?

Why Policymakers Favour Regionalisation

To remain balanced, it is important to acknowledge why regional centralisation appeals to policymakers, particularly within the constraints of modern governance, fiscal pressure, and fragmented local structures.

Supporters argue that fragmented local governance cannot deliver the scale of planning required for modern transport, housing, skills, and economic development.

Larger regional bodies promise:

• clearer strategic planning,

• simplified negotiation with central government,

• economies of scale,

• more coherent transport and housing systems,

• and the ability to deliver large infrastructure projects.

These aims are understandable. In several areas, existing district and county structures have already or are being replaced by single unitary authorities as a precursor to, or companion of, wider combined regional bodies.

But administrative efficiency does not, by itself, justify reducing democratic access or proceeding without clear public consent. It cannot substitute for legitimacy.

Taxation: Local Powers, Higher Burdens

One of the most consequential elements of regional centralisation is the possible expansion of local or regional tax-raising powers. These are framed as tools for flexibility and investment. But England’s fiscal reality makes additional taxation a plausible and, in many cases, likely outcome.

Regional authorities may be handed responsibilities without matching resources.

Central government is under severe financial pressure. The Treasury is unlikely to provide substantial new funding.

The likely result is that local taxes and levies could rise, often in areas least able to absorb the cost.

This is not empowerment.

It risks downloading fiscal strain onto households already struggling with living costs. Citizens may pay more while having less influence over the bodies that set those taxes.

Party Control and the Rise of Regional Governors

Regional executives are not simply administrative leaders. They are political figures whose authority derives from national party structures.

As regional governance expands, these executives increasingly function as de facto regional governors – each representing a potential “Number 10 of the North” within their region – negotiating directly with central government and overseeing large budgets.

If proportional representation or party-list systems are introduced at the regional level – a possibility discussed in several political circles – party control could intensify. Candidate selection may move further from communities and closer to party headquarters.

Local independents may struggle to compete. Citizens may find themselves voting for party lists rather than individuals they know.

This is not an expansion of democracy.

It risks becoming a consolidation of party power.

Global Governance and Public Distrust

Regional centralisation also sits within a broader global context.

International governance networks often favour larger-scale, technocratic models of administration.

Such frameworks emphasise efficiency, coordination, and strategic planning, but can do so at the expense of local autonomy.

Whether one supports or opposes these trends, the perception that power is drifting upward – toward larger units, distant executives, and global networks – contributes to public distrust.

Citizens may come to feel that decisions are being made far away, by people they did not choose directly, within systems they do not understand.

Regional centralisation amplifies that feeling.

The Manchester Question: Optics Versus Outcomes

Advocates of regional governance often point to Manchester as a success story. The city-region has made visible progress in areas such as transport branding, homelessness initiatives, and cultural identity.

But the deeper metrics are mixed:

• productivity growth has remained challenging,

• inequality remains persistent,

• housing affordability has worsened in many areas,

• transport integration remains incomplete,

• and health outcomes continue to vary sharply across neighbourhoods.

Manchester’s experience is complex. It may demonstrate the power of regional branding and strategic coordination, but it does not justify scaling up a model that simultaneously removes local councils, increases tax powers, and reduces democratic access.

Conclusion: A Democratic Architecture Being Rewritten Without Consent

England’s democratic architecture is being reshaped through regional centralisation.

This process:

• risks removing accessible local councils,

• concentrates power in regional executives,

• may expand party control,

• may introduce new tax burdens,

• proceeds without clear public consent,

• and revives a regional model that England has previously rejected when it was put directly to voters.

The narrative is empowerment.

The reality is consolidation.

The danger is not that regional centralisation might fail.

The greater danger is not failure, but success on these terms: England could wake up with fewer democratic access points, higher taxes, more insulated political elites, and a governance structure it never explicitly agreed to.

The constitutional principle remains clear:

A change of this magnitude can only be considered legitimate without a public vote if it demonstrably returns power to the people – not if it removes or distances it.

Regional centralisation risks doing the latter while presenting itself as the former.