Small Wins, Big Misreadings: Why the Right’s ‘Momentum’ Isn’t What It Seems

The debate after the Makerfield by-election has been framed as a problem of division:

Too many parties on the right, too many similar candidates, too many votes scattered across too many competing brands.

That is the easy explanation. It is also the wrong one.

The right is not losing because it is divided. It is divided because it is lost.

The familiar argument has already begun again. One party should “step aside” so another can win. A Reform MP has suggested that Restore should withdraw, or would otherwise carry responsibility if Reform failed to take power at the next general election. The Conservatives make the same claim when they insist Reform is splitting “their” vote.

Technically, yes: the vote was split.

But that fact does not prove what its loudest interpreters think it proves.

The numbers in Makerfield point to something more serious:

Even on the generous assumption that the Conservatives, Reform and Restore could have combined their votes, they still would not have beaten Burnham.

That matters because Makerfield was not a neutral test.

Yes, it had its own peculiar dynamics. The “get Burnham, get rid of Starmer” bounce created a surge of anti-Labour government energy that will not automatically repeat elsewhere.

This was a highly specific contest shaped by a high-profile figure, local sentiment and a desire to send a message.

Yet even with those favourable conditions, the result was not good for the right, and it should be setting off alarms in all three party headquarters.

If a by-election with a uniquely energised anti-government mood still could not produce a right-wing contender capable of overtaking Labour, then the problem is not simply the split.

The problem is that none of the parties is yet strong enough, connected enough or trusted enough to win in a way that really matters, even when the wind is supposedly at its back.

Aberdeen South Doesn’t Change the Picture – Even Though the Conservatives Won

If Makerfield exposed the right’s weakness in England, Aberdeen South exposed something just as important in Scotland, but from the opposite direction.

The Conservatives won Aberdeen South, and they are already presenting it as evidence of a comeback.

But that interpretation collapses the moment the context is taken seriously.

Aberdeen South was shaped by one defining issue:

The future of North Sea drilling – a question that cuts across party lines, regional identity and economic survival.

This was a contest in which the Conservatives could position themselves as defenders of local industry against a Labour Party perceived, rightly or wrongly, as hostile to it.

In other words, Aberdeen South was tailor-made for a Conservative win.

That does not make the result meaningless, but it does limit what can honestly be claimed from it.

It shows that the Conservatives can still win where the central issue aligns almost perfectly with their message, their history and their local brand.

That is not a national revival. It is a minimum expectation in conditions that were almost perfectly aligned.

Aberdeen South does not contradict the warning of Makerfield. It reinforces it. If the Conservatives can win only where the stars align perfectly, and Reform and Restore cannot win even when anti-government conditions are favourable, then the problem is not the seats.

The problem is the right itself.

The Entitlement Problem: Three Parties, One Assumption

The demand that another party should step aside is not a strategy.

It is entitlement dressed up as electoral realism.

Each party behaves as though it is the rightful heir to the right’s future:

• The Conservatives believe they deserve priority because they have the machine, the history and the infrastructure.

• Reform believes it deserves priority because it has momentum and a charismatic leader.

• Restore believes it deserves priority because it claims to represent “real conservatism.”

But none of them has earned the authority to make that claim.

This is the same problem I explored in What Is the Right Really For? (June 2026):

All three parties are fighting over a conservatism none of them can reach because none of them has yet shown that it understands what conservatism actually requires.

Conservatism, properly understood, is not merely reaction, nostalgia or grievance. It is a discipline of stewardship: responsibility to place, continuity, community, inherited duty and the moral obligation to preserve what is valuable while repairing what is broken.

If any one of these parties were truly resonating with the public, genuinely connecting with people and the issues shaping their lives, it would matter far less how many similar parties stood against it.

It would still find a way to win.

The fact that none of them can do that right now is the real story of both Makerfield and Aberdeen South.

Reform’s Paradox: Performance at the Top, Weakness Everywhere Else

Reform has one of the most media‑savvy political communicators in the country.

Nigel Farage is, by any measure, a highly effective performer in today’s media-driven politics. But a charismatic leader, and a handful of MPs able to survive the media scramble, is not a formula for government.

The issue is not the candidates themselves. It is the party around them.

Reform’s weakness is structural:

• its candidate-selection process is thin,

• its training and support systems are underdeveloped,

• its organisational culture is still built for insurgency, not governance.

If Reform wants to be a party of power, it has to act like one.

It needs to dress for the job it wants, not the one it already has.

And credibility is not a performance, but a discipline.

In today’s politics, authenticity is often performed for the camera, but Reform is not yet performing seriousness at street level – in its candidate depth, organisation and policy discipline.

Voters can sense when a party is not yet serious about the responsibilities it claims to seek.

Reform’s paradox is simple:

It has a leader who can command a room, but not yet a party that can command the country.

The Conservatives’ Advantage – and Their Curse

Only the Conservatives currently have the basic machinery of a party capable of fighting at scale:

• a functioning candidate‑selection machine,

• media‑ready candidates,

• and the ability to field hundreds of people who can survive the daily media grind.

That does not mean they should lead.

It does not mean they deserve to lead.

And it certainly does not mean they are the right vehicle for renewal.

But it does mean Reform and Restore are still a long way from having the organisational robustness required to compete across the country.

The Conservatives’ curse is different:

They have machinery, but no meaning.

This is the argument I made at the heart of Britain is Waiting for Leadership (May 2026):

The public is waiting for someone to lead, but the political class is looking the wrong way.

Restore’s Challenge: Values Without Viability

Restore claims to represent “real conservatism”, but it has not yet offered a coherent, interconnected policy framework that speaks to the real issues of the day.

Nor do the Conservatives.

Nor does Reform.

That is the deeper truth:

None of the parties on the right are fundamentally conservative in the sense people need.

They have slogans.

They have instincts.

They have grievances.

But they do not yet have a governing framework grounded in stewardship, locality, responsibility, continuity and community.

Politics without moral purpose becomes performance, not service.

The System Has Changed – And the Right Hasn’t

The assumption that “the right will form the next government anyway” is also a form of entitlement.

A real mandate comes only from:

• winning a majority,

• making clear, deliverable commitments that are thought through and result in the outcomes people need,

• which are then honoured with integrity.

That is difficult today because politics has been absorbed into a wider system:

A system that constrains, redirects and often neutralises the very governments elected to change it – through institutional inertia, legal frameworks, global economic pressures and the permanent machinery of administration.

This is the dynamic explored in The Contemporary Politician’s Dilemma (Dec 2024):

Governments inherit a system they do not control, and then get blamed for failing to change it.

Any party that does not recognise this, and does not level with the public about where we are, why we are here and how we got here, will find itself in exactly the same position Labour now occupies, and the Conservatives occupied before them.

The right cannot win by pretending the old world still exists.

The Part None of Them Wants to Hear

This is the part none of them wants to hear:

The uncomfortable truth is that none of these parties has yet shown it understands the tradition it claims to represent.

They keep insisting they are conservatives, yet too little in their behaviour suggests they understand what conservatism is, how it was lost, or why the right has collectively ended up in this mess.

This is the argument laid out plainly in What Is the Right Really For? (June 2026):

They have forgotten the meaning of the very tradition they all claim to defend.

The UK is at a crisis point. The public is weighing the credibility of every option on the right, hoping that this time the label on the tin will match the contents inside.

People are tired of buying promises that evaporate the moment the votes are counted.

The problem is not how the deckchairs are arranged. The problem is that the ship itself is taking on water, and the public knows it. They do not want another reshuffle of the same broken parts. They want to be rescued from the very real risk of the whole UK ship going down.

That requires something more serious than a new slogan or a rearranged alliance.

Not a novelty vessel. Not a rebranded dinghy. Not a patched-up version of the one already taking on water.

It requires a traditional ship: one that recognises its own value, its heritage and its purpose, rather than accepting the value assigned to it by the same forces that have spent decades weakening what it once protected.

Until the right understands that, it is not ready to lead.

The Real Lesson of Makerfield – and Aberdeen South

The lesson of Makerfield and Aberdeen South is not that the right needs fewer parties.

It is that the right needs a purpose strong enough to shape those parties into something capable of governing.

Together, these contests show that:

• The right has energy, but no coherence.

• It has anger, but no shared purpose.

• It has instincts, but no strategy.

• It has parties, but no movement.

• It has performers, but not enough authenticity.

• It has leaders, but not enough of the right candidates.

• It has values, but no viable policies.

• It has ambition, but no understanding of the system it seeks to govern.

Until the right understands the system it is operating in, stops demanding that others step aside, and starts building real connection, depth and honesty, it will keep losing elections it believes it should win.

The right does not need fewer parties.

It needs a purpose that can survive reality.

Until then, “step aside” politics is not strategy. It is avoidance – a distraction from the deeper work none of the parties has yet begun.

Until then, “step aside” politics is not strategy. It is avoidance – a distraction from the deeper work none of the parties has yet begun.

What is the Right Really For? – Why Britain’s Conservatives, Reform UK and Restore are Fighting Over Something None of them can Reach

British politics is full of noise, but nowhere is the confusion deeper today than on the political right.

The Conservative Party, Reform UK and Restore are fighting to be recognised as the true voice of the right. Each claims it alone can “save” the country. Each accuses the others of betrayal, weakness or irrelevance. And yet all three are reaching for something that now sits beyond their grasp.

To many voters, this looks like chaos.

To those inside the parties, it feels like a fight for survival.

But the deeper truth is far more important:

All three parties are trying to reclaim the same thing: a form of conservatism that the modern political system no longer allows to exist.

That is the real “race to the bottom”: not a competition to be the most populist or extreme, but a desperate scramble to rediscover a purpose that has slipped out of reach.

In simple terms, this article argues that Britain’s right-wing parties are not merely competing over policies, personalities or slogans. They are fighting over a deeper question: What is the right actually for, when the social, economic and political conditions that once sustained conservatism have been steadily dismantled?

The Right’s Original Purpose: The One Thing They All Should Still Share

Before we can understand the crisis on the right, we need to understand what the right is supposed to be for.

Traditional conservatism was built on six simple but powerful ideas:

  • Locality – decisions made close to the people affected by them.
  • Community – strong social bonds, shared responsibility and mutual obligation.
  • Stewardship – care for land, heritage, institutions and the inheritance passed between generations.
  • Continuity – change that is evolutionary and rooted, rather than sudden and destructive.
  • Identity – belonging grounded in place, memory and shared experience.
  • Self-governance – power held by the governed, not by distant authorities beyond meaningful democratic control.

This is what conservatism is at its root.

This is what the right once existed to conserve.

And this is the foundation that should, in theory, unite the Conservatives, Reform UK and Restore.

But it does not, because the political landscape in which these parties operate no longer supports these principles in any meaningful way.

How the Right Lost Its Purpose – A Story of Drift and Disconnection

To understand today’s fragmentation, we need to understand how the right became detached from its own foundations.

This did not happen all at once. It happened through drift, compromise and disconnection.

1. The 1970s: The Ground Shifts Under the Right’s Feet

From the 1970s onwards, Britain’s move towards more centralised and supranational forms of governance began to erode several of the things on which traditional conservatism depends. Centralisation means decision-making moving upwards, away from towns, counties and communities. Supranational governance means important decisions being shaped beyond the nation state, through institutions and arrangements that sit above national democratic control.

  • local autonomy
  • national decision-making
  • community-rooted politics

Traditional conservatism depends on those things because it is rooted in the belief that people, places and inherited institutions matter.

But much of the right did not see the danger clearly, because it assumed the world it knew would continue unchanged.

2. The 1980s–2000s: Neoliberalism Replaces Conservatism

The decisive break came when neoliberalism began to replace conservatism.

Neoliberalism, in this context, means a market-led, globalised economic outlook that prioritises (corporate) deregulation, competition, finance, corporate scale and consumer choice.

The right increasingly embraced:

  • deregulation
  • financialisation
  • global markets
  • corporate power
  • consumerism
  • managerial politics

These are not conservative values in the traditional sense.

They are economic ideologies and operating assumptions.

Over time, they hollowed out the right’s philosophical core.

Conservatism, rooted in community, identity and stewardship, became a ghost inside a political movement that no longer fully understood itself.

3. The 2000s–2010s: The Hollowing Out Becomes Visible

By the 2000s and 2010s, that hollowing out had become visible.

Without a clear purpose, the right became:

  • reactive
  • fragmented
  • populist in tone
  • technocratic in practice
  • dependent on media cycles
  • unable to articulate what it stands for

This was the moment when the right often appeared to stop conserving people, places and institutions, and instead began conserving the system itself.

That loss of purpose did not remain abstract. It surfaced most clearly in the anti-EU movement.

The Deep Irony: The Anti‑EU Movement was Conservatism’s Last Instinctive Rebellion

Here is the irony that explains much of today’s political confusion:

The anti-EU movement was traditional conservatism trying to save itself, without fully realising that the philosophical ground beneath it had already been removed.

The instincts behind the movement were deeply conservative:

  • local control
  • national self‑determination
  • suspicion of distant authority
  • protection of community identity
  • desire for continuity and rootedness

But the right that led and shaped the movement had already embraced many of the forces – globalisation, centralisation and corporatism – that had made traditional conservatism so difficult to sustain.

So the movement fought the symptoms of the drift, rather than the drift itself.

It tried to reverse a trend that the right had already helped create.

For example, a politics that speaks about local control cannot easily thrive in a country where planning, infrastructure, public services and economic life are increasingly shaped by distant institutions, large corporations, national targets and global pressures.

That is why the argument goes deeper than Europe alone.

The Modern Split: Conservatives, Reform UK and Restore Are Fighting Over the Same Lost Purpose

This is the part we all need to understand.

The Conservative Party, Reform UK and Restore are not divided as they are because they stand for completely different philosophies.

They are divided because they all want to reclaim the same thing – traditional conservatism – but none of them can reach it within the current system.

The Conservatives

The Conservatives are trying to defend a system that no longer reflects conservative values. They carry the name, history and institutional memory of the right, but they have become too closely associated with the very political and economic structures that displaced traditional conservatism.

Reform UK

Reform UK is trying to break the system, or at least disrupt it, without always making clear what durable conservative order should replace it. It channels anger at drift, centralisation and betrayal, but protest is not the same as reconstruction.

Restore

Restore is trying to revive traditional conservatism in a landscape where the conditions that once supported it have been weakened to the point they no longer function the way they once did. Its instinct is to return to first principles, but those principles now have to operate in a system built against them.

The three visible parts of the right are fighting each other because:

  • they feel the same loss
  • they sense the same drift
  • they are chasing the same instincts
  • they are trying to conserve something the system itself has dismantled

Their conflict is therefore not simply ideological.

It is existential.

They are competing to represent a philosophy that the political operating system no longer allows to function.

Why the Left Appears More Unified

This contrast matters.

The left achieved much of its historic mission decades ago:

  • suffrage
  • workers’ rights
  • the NHS
  • the welfare state

These were extraordinary achievements.

Once achieved, the left’s original foundational purpose was essentially complete.

So the left adapted.

It became:

  • flexible
  • narrative‑driven
  • culturally aligned
  • institutionally embedded
  • comfortable with centralisation
  • comfortable with supranationalism

The left arguably appears unified today not because it has a clear purpose, but because it has no foundational mission left to betray.

It can adapt to remain relevant.

The right struggles to adapt cohesively and together because it has forgotten, or lost the conditions for, what it is supposed to conserve.

The Real Problem: Conservatism Cannot Meaningfully Exist in the Current System

This is the truth the right often refuses to face:

Conservatism cannot meaningfully exist within the current system.

Conservatism requires:

  • local decision‑making
  • community autonomy
  • stewardship
  • identity
  • continuity
  • self‑governance

But the current system is built around:

  • centralisation
  • corporatism
  • globalisation
  • managerialism
  • technocracy
  • distant authority

These two worldviews sit in deep tension.

That is why the right is in a race to the bottom.

It is trying to rediscover a purpose that the system itself has made effectively impossible to practise.

In practical terms, this can be seen when local communities feel they have little control over development, when national economies depend on global supply chains, when public institutions are managed through targets rather than relationships, or when identity is treated as a branding exercise rather than a lived bond between people and place.

So What Is the Right Really For?

If the right rediscovered its purpose, it would stand for:

  • Local power
  • Community‑rooted economies
  • Stewardship of land and environment
  • Identity grounded in place and shared experience
  • Governance by the governed
  • Institutions that serve people, not systems

This is not nostalgia.

This is not ideology for its own sake.

This is not populism.

This is real conservatism: the kind that protects people, places, institutions and the bonds between them.

But until the right recognises that the system itself prevents these values from flourishing, it will continue its race to the bottom, mistaking noise for purpose, populism for philosophy, and survival for renewal.

The Message That Needs to Be Heard

Britain’s right-wing parties are not simply enemies.

They are fragments of the same broken whole.

They are all trying to reclaim a conservatism that the modern political system has made effectively impossible to practise.

Until they recognise this, they will keep fighting each other and keep losing sight of the very thing they should exist to protect:

People.

Places.

Communities.

And the continuity that binds them together.

Until the right redefines its purpose for the system as it is, not the one it remembers, it will keep fighting itself instead of shaping the country.

Britain is Waiting for Leadership – But UK Politics is Looking the Wrong Way

Across the political landscape, there is a growing sense of drift – a feeling that the people who should be providing direction are instead absorbed in their own internal battles, positioning, and noise.

At a time when the country needs leadership that is present, grounded, and prepared for what lies ahead, politics seems to be looking everywhere except towards the public it serves.

Makerfield, tensions inside Reform UK, the emergence of Restore, questions around Nigel Farage, the Conservative Party’s search for relevance – each story adds to a wider impression of movement without direction. Noise without presence. Activity without leadership.

And the irony is stark:

Labour is struggling with power – yet the disarray elsewhere makes them appear much steadier than they are.

This is not a moment defined by ideology or partisanship.

It is a moment defined by absence.

Reform and Restore: Movements Searching for Shape

Reform UK once appeared to be the natural home for voters who felt unheard. But instead of consolidating that momentum, it has become a space where internal tensions are playing out in public. These disagreements are not deep ideological divides – they are differences in emphasis, tone, and direction. And they are unfolding at a moment when clarity and unity would matter most.

Restore, meanwhile, has built its identity around a single issue that, while serious and emotive, cannot carry the weight of a national political project on its own. The grooming gangs inquiry will matter deeply to many people, but it cannot be the foundation for a governing vision. The country’s challenges are broader, deeper, and more interconnected than any one issue can capture.

Both parties are trying to articulate something real – a sense that the country has been let down and deserves better. But neither has yet stepped fully into the space the public is hoping someone will occupy.

The Farage Story and the Atmosphere Around Reform

The questions surrounding Nigel Farage’s £5 million “gift” have created an atmosphere of uncertainty around Reform at a time when the party needed stability. Whether the story ultimately proves significant or not, it has shifted the conversation away from policy and towards internal scrutiny – and that shift has consequences.

The public is not looking for perfection. But they are looking for steadiness. And steadiness is in short supply.

The Conservatives and the Pull of the Past

The Conservative Party, still recovering from its 2024 collapse, has slipped back into familiar patterns – waiting for the political pendulum to swing back in their favour.

But the country that once responded to that rhythm has changed. The challenges ahead are structural, not cyclical. They cannot be met with nostalgia or by hoping the public will simply return.

There are talented voices within the party – people who speak clearly and connect with voters – but they are operating in a space where the party itself has not yet accepted the scale of the shift required.

Renewal cannot begin until the party acknowledges that the old formulas no longer work.

The Left Is Not Offering Certainty Either

It would be a mistake to imagine that the left is providing a clear alternative.

Labour’s landslide was not a surge of enthusiasm but a release of frustration. And since taking office, the party has often appeared more focused on internal processes and the ideas of its politicians than on the legitimacy crisis unfolding across the country.

The Liberal Democrats continue to speak the language of cooperation and internationalism, but often in ways that feel disconnected from the concerns of communities who feel left behind by globalisation.

The Greens, once rooted in localism and environmental stewardship, now face the same pressures as every other party – the pull towards national relevance at the cost of their original identity.

None of these parties are failing maliciously. They are simply struggling to meet a moment that demands more than the system is currently designed to give.

What the Country Needs

The country does not need another round of political point‑scoring. It does not need parties fighting for position while the ground beneath them shifts. It does not need leaders who are looking up – to donors, to media narratives, to internal factions – instead of looking outwards to the people they serve.

What the country needs is a political presence capable of dealing with what is coming down the line. A presence that can steward us through difficulties that are now baked in, no matter how events unfold. A presence that understands that the work ahead is not about managing decline or restoring the past, but about rebuilding the foundations of governance itself.

Most importantly, the country needs leadership willing to begin – and see through – the essential work of changing how power operates.

That means rethinking how public services are delivered, how decisions are made, and how accountability flows.

It means bringing power, responsibility, and agency back to local people and their communities.

This cannot be about consolidating authority or trying to repair a system that has already exhausted its credibility. It cannot be about putting the train back on the tracks and pretending the old journey is still possible.

It must begin with accepting that the roles politicians hold – or hope to gain – are no longer sustainable in their current form.

Everything taken from people, communities, and their environment must be given back – without caveats, without guarantees, and without delay.

Leadership Begins With Presence

The country is not waiting for perfection. It is waiting for presence. For someone – anyone – to step into the room and lead.

Not with slogans.

Not with theatrics.

But with honesty, humility, and a willingness to rebuild from the ground up.

Because until that happens, politics will continue to look inward while the country looks for someone who is willing to look outward – and step forward.

End of the ‘Duopoly’ – or the Slow Death of the Entire UK Political System?

Public narratives have increasingly been used to shape how we interpret major events – often subtly, often through fear, and often in ways that encourage us to accept outcomes that might never have emerged if we had been left to form our own conclusions.

Whether it’s the breathless insistence that an AI takeover is inevitable or the framing of political change as something predetermined, narratives have become tools for steering public belief long before reality has settled.

Sometimes these narratives are deliberately crafted. Other times, even those repeating them may not fully understand the consequences of the stories they help spread.

Either way, the effect is the same: they shape how we see the world during a period that is already turbulent and uncertain.

The New Post‑Election Narrative: “The End of the Duopoly”

In the hours following the 2026 UK local election results, a striking uniformity appeared across political commentary. The phrase “end of the duopoly” – referring to the supposed collapse of Labour–Conservative dominance – began appearing everywhere at once.

Even early on Saturday 9 May, with all results declared, the framing had already solidified: the UK is entering a new era of multi‑party politics, with Reform UK positioned as the emerging force.

But what does this narrative actually mean? And more importantly – what does it leave out?

Contextualising the Claim

The UK has never been a strict two‑party system, but the electoral mechanics of First Past the Post have historically produced two dominant blocs.

The new narrative suggests:

  • Labour and the Conservatives are losing their structural dominance.
  • Reform UK is becoming the largest force in a fragmented landscape.
  • A European‑style multi‑party system is emerging.

Specialist pollsters have already produced “like‑for‑like” general‑election projections based on the local‑election vote shares.

These projections – while not predictions – suggest that Reform could become the largest party but still fall short of a majority, requiring cooperation with the Conservatives to govern.

This would conveniently provide an explanation for any undelivered promises: coalition constraints, market pressures, or the need for “stability”.

A Straightforward Interpretation – But an Incomplete One

Yes, the Greens also performed strongly, though not at the levels some earlier polling suggested. Yes, the Conservatives and Labour both suffered significant losses. And yes, this could be read as the new normal for British politics.

But the deeper question is whether this is truly a political realignment – or simply the next step in a much longer, more fundamental breakdown.

The Systemic Problem Beneath the Party Shifts

Most people see politics only at the surface level: parties, personalities, and promises.

But the problems facing the UK today are not primarily the result of individual politicians or even individual parties.

They are the consequences of a system that has been allowed to drift into dysfunction.

The UK’s political‑economic model – neoliberal, globalised, market‑centric, and dependent on fiat‑money expansion – has:

  • extracted productivity and resilience from the economy
  • created a bloated but underperforming public sector
  • generated unsustainable levels of public and private debt
  • masked deepening poverty through an ever‑expanding benefits system
  • reduced political leadership to managerialism rather than representation

The expected to be outgoing Prime Minister may be an extreme example of the political class at its worst, but he is not an outlier. His behaviour, motivations, and priorities are symptoms of a political culture that has lost its connection to public service.

Different parties may sound different, but they operate within – and are shaped by – the same system.

Their incentives, constraints, and worldview are aligned far more closely than their rhetoric suggests.

Is This Really a “Shift” – or the Last Gasp of a Failing Model?

What is unfolding may not be a realignment at all. It may be the final attempt by political actors to fix systemic problems using the same tools, rules, and assumptions that created those problems in the first place.

Reform UK could, in theory, be a vehicle for genuine change. But the evidence so far suggests they may simply continue the trajectory set by Labour and the Conservatives – not necessarily because they lack intent, but because once confronted with the realities of governing within the existing system, they will face the same constraints.

The brief premiership of Liz Truss is a cautionary tale: the system can eject a government faster than voters can.

The Bigger Picture

The real seismic shift may not be the 2026 local elections or even the next general election. It may be the slow, grinding collapse of a political‑economic system that no longer works – and the emergence of something new that none of the current political class is prepared for.

The “end of the duopoly” may be less a new beginning and more a sign that the old system is running out of road.

What Happens When Reform Cannot Deliver Either?

It’s the day after the local elections, and the results coming in from across the country suggest a seismic shift in British politics – one that could shape the next Westminster government in ways we have not yet fully grasped.

Yet we talk as if both the causes and the consequences of this shift are already understood. People speak with a confidence that suggests the answers are obvious. But the questions that actually matter – why this is happening, how far it goes, what it really means, and where it stops – are barely being touched. And when you actually look inside the political “can” we’ve opened, the reality is nothing like the branding most people think they recognise.

A big part of the problem is that many do not really understand the political choices in front of us. The problems seem easy to understand; the solutions appear logical and the answer for many really does to come in the shape of Reform UK.

On the face of it, Reform have come from nowhere. But they have not appeared out of thin air. Reform grew out of the Brexit Party, which grew out of UKIP, which itself followed earlier formations such as the Anti-Federalist League.

What looks new is, in part, simply the latest evolution of something that has been developing for decades. They have a charismatic leader who seems to connect effortlessly with the disenfranchised and the angry. Their polling, media presence and narrative momentum all suggest that voting Reform is becoming, for many, the clearest available expression of a desire for change.

But that is all it is: an expression of desire. And once you widen the lens, the picture becomes clearer.

Commentators discussing today’s results talk as if Reform are achieving something UKIP never managed. But pre-referendum UKIP was an openly single-issue party and did not pretend otherwise. Reform is different in form, but not in kind. It is the next evolution: playing the same game as everyone else in politics, talking up this and that, while the reality would look very different if and when the responsibility of government ever became theirs.

However, the problems the UK faces can no longer be solved by the political system we have, because the issues are now systemic – rooted in the way power, money, institutions and incentives are arranged – and our political system is itself part of the problem.

Once you accept that, you can begin to see that we have passed the point where any government can do anything meaningful without confronting the entire structure head-on.

Anything else is just throwing stones at symptoms while claiming to treat the cause.

The way we think about politics mirrors the way our politicians think about the world.

That shared mindset blinds us to the mechanics of a system that continues to function only because key parts of it remain hidden: where power really sits, how responsibility is displaced, and how failure is managed politically rather than resolved.

Even politicians with the best motives cannot act against a structure that survives under the mantra: “this is just the way it is”.

This is why the questions around Reform’s candidate selection, their approach to local governance, and what happens when they take control of councils matter – but not in the way people assume.

The collapse of local government is already baked into the system through financial strain, hollowed-out capacity and deep dependence on central government, regardless of who runs it. Yet this is obscured by the familiar narrative that Westminster is where everything happens, leaving local government to look irrelevant even as it quietly fails.

And that brings us to the national picture. Local government is not separate from Westminster so much as an early warning of the same underlying limits. It is only if and when Reform hold power nationally that we will truly see what they can – and, more importantly, cannot – do.

No matter the talk about “the blob”, out-of-control civil servants or schemes like DOGE, the penny will drop quickly. The promises, whether plausible or not, will collide with the same structural limits that constrained Labour before them and the Conservatives before that: institutional inertia, fiscal pressure, market dependence, and a state far less free-moving than political rhetoric suggests.

They cannot use the power entrusted to them unless they are prepared to challenge the entire system – and nothing suggests they are.

In reality, Reform’s expanding establishment credentials and growing comfort within the system are already visible at almost every turn: in the broadening of their appeal, in the professionalisation of their pitch, and in the familiar gap between political language and political reality. And if the system has not already collapsed – through the actions of this government, through global events linked to conflict, or through something like market failure – by the time they reach government – if indeed they can, Reform will simply become the next set of public figureheads seen to be in control, right up until collapse arrives from whichever direction it eventually comes.

This is the real tragedy. The journey of misplaced hope that so many are now on is not inevitable. With the support Reform clearly have, they could be agents of genuine change – if they were willing to live up to the responsibility they seek and turn their rhetoric about putting the country first into something arguably more than lip service.

But none of the parties are offering anything fundamentally different. They are all offering variations of the same approach, shaped by the same assumptions, constrained by the same machinery.

Until we have a political movement that isn’t trying to “do politics” in the way we currently understand it, our direction remains set. The problems will continue to deepen, and sooner or later they will spiral beyond control.

When that moment comes, we will be left at the mercy of whoever can shout loudest – and facing a future far darker than anything most people currently imagine when they hear the name Reform.